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Abstract
The 1996 Farm Act gives farmers almost complete planting flexibility, allowing
producers to respond to price changes to a greater extent than they had under
previous legislation.  This study measures supply responsiveness for major
field crops to changes in their own prices and in prices for competing crops and
indicates significant increases in responsiveness.  Relative to 1986-90, the per-
centage increases in the responsiveness of U.S. plantings of major field crops
to a 1-percent change in their own prices are wheat (1.2 percent), corn (41.6
percent), soybeans (13.5 percent), and cotton (7.9 percent).  In percentage
terms, the increases in the responsiveness generally become greater with
respect to competing crops’ price changes.  The 1996 legislation has the least
effect on U.S. wheat acreage, whereas the law may lead to an average increase
of 2 million acres during 1996-2005 in soybean acreage, a decline of 1-2 mil-
lion acres in corn acreage, and an increase of 0.7 million acres in cotton
acreage.  Overall, the effect of the farm legislation on regional production pat-
terns of major field crops appears to be modest.  Corn acreage expansion in the
Central and Northern Plains, a long-term trend in this important wheat produc-
tion region, will slow under the 1996 legislation, while soybean acreage expan-
sion in this region will accelerate.  The authors used the Policy Analysis
System-Economic Research Service (POLYSYS-ERS) model that was jointly
developed by USDA’s Economic Research Service and the University of
Tennessee’s Agricultural Policy Analysis Center to estimate the effects of the
1996 legislation.
K Ke ey yw wo or rd ds s: : Supply response, major field crops, acreage price elasticities,
normal flex acreage (NFA), 1996 farm legislation.
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Supply response for crops has historically been heavily influenced by the effects
of agricultural commodity programs.  Structural relations estimated under the
previous policy environment, however, may no longer hold under the Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (1996 Act) because most of
the restrictions imposed on producers’ planting decisions are now removed.  A
central question resulting from this policy change is how responsive plantings
are to movement in market prices under the 1996 Act compared with previous
legislation.
This technical bulletin estimates producers’ supply response under the 1996 Act
for major field crops by production region.  The study also measures the effect
of planting flexibility under the 1996 Act on aggregate acreage planted to major
field crops, crop acreage composition, farm prices, and regional production
adjustments.  The general approach taken is an indepth analysis of producers’
planting decisions during 1991-95, when producers were granted limited plant-
ing flexibility under the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990
(1990 Act), and then to infer their likely acreage response to market incentives
under the 1996 Act.
Own- and cross-price acreage elasticities for major U.S. field crops are greater
(producers’ planting decisions are more responsive to price changes), in most
cases, under the 1996 Act than those estimated under previous legislation due to
almost full planting flexibility.  Relative to 1986-90, the own-price acreage elas-
ticity under the 1996 Act shows an increase in the responsiveness of U.S. wheat
producers to a change in the wheat price by 1.2 percent.  For other commodities,
the percentage increases are as follows: corn (41.6%), soybeans (13.5%), and
cotton (7.9%).  In percentage terms, cross-price acreage elasticities estimated
under the 1996 Act generally increase even more than own-price elasticities.
This finding implies that farm commodity programs in the past might have
restricted acreage shifts from program crops to other crops.
The increases in own- and cross-price elasticities tend to have offsetting effects
on acreage changes in total.  As a consequence, results in this study indicate that
the aggregate effect of the 1996 Act on area planted to the eight major field
crops (wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, oats, soybeans, cotton, and rice) is modest
when compared with plantings under a continuation of the 1990 Act.  The 1996
Act has the least effect on U.S. wheat acreage, in part due to small changes in
acreage price elasticities between the 1990 Act and 1996 Act.  Corn acreage
expansion in the Central and Northern Plains, a long-term trend in this impor-
tant wheat production region, will slow under the 1996 Act, while soybean
acreage expansion in this region will accelerate.  The 1996 Act has its biggest
acreage effect on soybeans—an increase of over 2 million acres throughout the
entire 1996-2005 period.  Nearly full planting flexibility allows corn producers




















Supply response for crops has historically been heavily
influenced by the effects of agricultural commodity
programs.  Structural relations estimated under the
previous policy environment, however, may no longer
hold under the Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act of 1996 (1996 Act), because most of the
restrictions imposed on producers’ planting decisions
are now removed.1 With elimination of target-price-
based deficiency payments, government payments
have become a less important factor in producers’
planting decisions.  When market prices are above
commodity loan rates, supply response is based largely
on market incentives.2 A central question resulting
from this policy change is how responsive plantings
are to movement in market prices under the 1996 Act
compared with previous legislation.3
Ideally, if a long enough time series were available,
structural supply response relationships could be re-
estimated to provide a satisfactory answer to this ques-
tion.  However, because the 1996 Act was implement-
ed fairly recently, historical data are not yet sufficient
to re-estimate the structural relations.  Yet, policymak-
ers and market participants want to know how produc-
ers will respond to market forces under the 1996 Act
and how the act will affect U.S. agriculture.  Thus, the
change in farm programs calls for a new, innovative
approach to estimating U.S. supply response.
Greater supply response, which is manifested through
enhanced planting flexibility under the 1996 Act, has a
host of important implications for U.S. field crops.
How will the 1996 Act alter national aggregate acreage
planted to major field crops and crop acreage composi-
tion?  Will the removal of acreage bases and planting
restrictions trigger a shift away from continuous corn
operations toward a corn-soybean rotation?  Will the
1996 Act dampen or facilitate the long-term trend in
the expansion of corn and soybean acreage in the
Central and Northern Plains region, where over half of
U.S. wheat acreage is located?  Will the 1996 Act
drastically alter regional production patterns for major
field crops?  What will be the price impacts of any
acreage shifts?  Will the effects of changes in the farm
program on crop acreage differ in a comparison of
high-price and low-price market conditions?
The purposes of this report are two-fold: (1) to esti-
mate producers’supply response under the 1996 Act
for major field crops and by production region; and
(2) to measure the effect of the 1996 Act on aggregate
acreage planted to major field crops, acreage planted to
individual crops, regional production adjustments, and
farm prices. This study recognizes the difference in
producers’supply response between the 1996 Act and
previous legislation and incorporates new acreage price
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elasticities into estimates of the impact of the 1996 Act
on the U.S. field crops sector. The general approach
taken here is to gain an indepth understanding of pro-
ducers’planting decisions during 1991-95, when pro-
ducers were granted limited planting flexibility under
the 1990 Act, and then to infer their likely acreage
response to market incentives under the 1996 Act.
The supply response information presented in this
report can be useful in analyzing U.S. agricultural pol-
icy and farm commodity programs, as well as in com-
modity market analysis.  An indepth analysis of 1991-
95 planting decisions is conducted for program-crop
normal flex acreage (NFA), the 15 percent of base
acreage under the 1990 Act where producers were per-
mitted to grow any approved crops without loss of
base, but received no deficiency payments.  This
analysis is used to infer producers’ acreage response to
market incentives under the 1996 Act, with estimates
of own- and cross-price elasticities for major field
crops derived at the national level and in specific pro-
duction regions.  Then, using these new elasticity esti-
mates, the effects of supply response aspects of the
1996 Act for field crops are presented, based on a
comparison of simulations of a U.S. agricultural sector
model.  Finally, uses of the new supply response elas-
ticities are illustrated in short-term, acreage-forecast-
ing applications.Evolution of Supply Management
Programs Toward Planting Flexibility
U.S. agricultural commodity policy has undergone
important changes over the last 10 to 15 years, particu-
larly regarding supply management programs.  Policy
changes since the mid-1980’s have significantly
changed agriculture from the highly managed sector of
the early- and mid-1980’s to a more market-oriented
sector today (Nelson and Schertz; Young and Shields).  
Supply Management Policy Evolution to
Market Orientation
Under the 1985 Act, supply management programs
significantly limited producers’ planting decisions with
both institutional barriers and economic barriers to
acreage shifting among crops.  Requirements to plant
the program crop (or to certify acreage as “considered
planted”) to protect the farmer’s acreage base for that
crop were a strong institutional barrier to planting flex-
ibility.  Large deficiency payment rates, although a
benefit of program participation, also represented an
economic barrier to planting flexibility.  As a result,
program participation rates were high, supply response
was significantly constrained, and the programs
encouraged the planting of the same program crops
over time.
Farm legislation in 1990 provided farmers some plant-
ing flexibility.  Flexibility to plant other crops on 25
percent of program-crop base acres was permitted with
base protection for any acreage switched, thus break-
ing the institutional barrier to flexibility.  On 15 per-
cent of the acreage base (normal flex acres), there
were no deficiency payments regardless of the planting
choice, effectively eliminating the economic barrier to
use of planting flexibility.  For the remaining 10 per-
cent of the acreage base where planting flexibility
applied (optional flex acres), deficiency payments
were paid if the program crop was planted, but were
foregone for each acre that was flexed to an alternative
crop.  On optional flex acres, therefore, the economic
barrier to use of flexibility remained.  The combination
of these program changes partly opened supply
response to market forces.  There was considerable use
of flexibility on normal flex acres, where both the
institutional and the economic barriers were removed,
but there was only limited switching on optional flex
acres, where economic barriers (in particular, the
potential loss of deficiency payments) remained.
The 1996 Act introduced nearly full planting flexibili-
ty.  With only a few limitations, planting alternative
crops is now permitted on a farmer’s entire acreage
base, thus fully eliminating institutional barriers to
flexibility.  Under the 1996 Act, farmers who partici-
pated in the wheat, feed grain, cotton, and rice pro-
grams in any one of the years 1991-95 could enter into
7-year production flexibility contracts and receive pay-
ments for the years 1996-2002.4 These contract pay-
ments are not linked to production choices—farmers
receive the full contract payment so long as the land is
kept in an agricultural use.  Thus, economic barriers to
flexibility are also removed under the 1996 Act, mak-
ing supply response more open to market forces.
A Closer Look at 1990 Farm Legislation
Because most of the U.S. experience with planting
flexibility was during 1991-95 under provisions of
1990 farm legislation, features of that legislation and
the economic planting incentives during those years
are discussed in this section.  This also sets the stage
for the supply response estimation that follows, based
mostly on analysis of normal flex acreage.  
To facilitate the analysis of the economics of various
planting decisions, we used a net returns framework
(Westcott, 1991; Westcott and Glauber).  Comparisons
of net returns for different planting options form the
basis for the cropping choices that farmers make to
maximize profits.  Of particular interest is how pro-
gram payments affected producers’ decisions.
Program Participation Decision (Whole Base)
Program payments under 1990 farm legislation affect-
ed producers’ decisions to enroll in the annual com-
modity programs by influencing expected net returns.
Equations 1a, 1b, and 1c indicate alternative average
per-acre net returns to, respectively, (a) enrolling in the
program for a program crop (and planting the program
crop to the extent permitted); (b) not enrolling in the
program but planting the program crop; and (c) plant-
ing an alternative competing crop.
(1a) Market returns plus Government payments for
program crop; program participant:
NRp = (1 - ARP) (P * Y - VC) + (1 - ARP - 0.15)  D




























%(1b) Market returns; non-participant:
NRn = P * Y - VC
(1c) Market returns for alternative competing crop:
NR' = P' * Y' - VC' 
NRp,N R n, and NR' are alternative expected net
returns; P,Y, and VC are price, yield, and variable pro-
duction costs for the program crop; P',Y', and VC' are
price, yield, and variable production costs for an alter-
native competing crop; ARP is the annual Acreage
Reduction Program land-idling requirement; and D is
the deficiency payment rate on a per-acre basis.
Net returns for program participation reflect both the
benefits of expected deficiency payments as well as
the costs of idling land.  Provisions of the 1990 farm
legislation that reduced payment acres lowered the
acreage eligible for deficiency payments by 15 percent
of the acreage base, as indicated in equation 1a.  Net
returns for the program crop as a nonparticipant or for
an alternative competing crop are based on the market-
place, equaling expected market receipts minus vari-
able production costs.
The decision to participate in the program was a
whole-base decision prior to the 1996 Act, meaning
that farmers either enrolled their entire base acreage in
the program or grew the program crop or an alternative
competing crop outside of the program. Deficiency
payments affected the participation decision, as indi-
cated by the inclusion of payments in equation 1a. A
choice to not participate or to plant an alternative crop
would be based on the net returns associated with those
decisions, compared with the net returns and program
payments associated with the participation option.
Other factors that could affect the program participa-
tion decision included a lack of base protection if a
producer planted an alternative crop or idled land as a
nonparticipant.  Flexibility provisions that allowed
some shifting to other crops while protecting the pro-
gram crop acreage base only applied to program par-
ticipants.  Thus, farmers wanting to shift to other crops
without a loss of base acreage would need to enroll in
the program.  On the other hand, however, a program
participant could not plant the program crop beyond
the size of the acreage base.  If a farmer wanted to
overplant the acreage base and enlarge the base for
future years, this could be done only as a nonpartici-
pant for the year of overplantings.
Planting Decisions for Subcomponents of
Enrolled Acreage Base
As a whole-base decision, program payments affected
the decision to participate.  However, once in the pro-
gram, how did program payments affect marginal
planting choices for different parts of the enrolled
acreage base?  Again, these planting decisions can be
examined by analyzing net returns associated with
each of the subcomponents of the enrolled base.
These subcomponents include normal flex acreage,
optional flex acreage, and nonflex acreage divided into
two parts related to the 0/85 program.  For each
acreage base subcomponent, average per-acre net
returns for alternative planting choices are presented.
For illustration purposes, a farm with a 100-acre base
is used in the discussion.  Also, to simplify the arith-
metic, the examples presented assume a 0-percent
Acreage Reduction Program (ARP), as was imple-
mented in 1994 for corn.  Acreage designations and
corresponding program payment acres for two planting
alternatives, the regular program and the 0/85 program,
are also illustrated in figure 1.
N No or rm ma al l   f fl le ex x   a ac cr re ea ag ge e. . Normal flex acreage (NFA) cov-
ered 15 acres of the 100-acre base.  On these acres, no
deficiency payments were made regardless of whether
or not the farmer planted the program crop.  Planting
flexibility provisions allowed the planting of alterna-
tive crops on these acres without penalty.  Net returns
for planting the original program crop were therefore
based on market returns, as shown in equation 2a,
while plantings of a permitted alternative crop also
were based on its market returns, as in equation 2b.
Because there are no deficiency payments in equation
2a, Government payments did not affect the planting
decision on these acres, and the producer’s planting
decision was based on expected market returns among
competing crops.
(2a) NFA, market returns for program crop:
NR = P * Y - VC
(2b) NFA, market returns for alternative competing
crop:
NR' = P' * Y' - VC'    
O Op pt ti io on na al l   f fl le ex x   a ac cr re ea ag ge e. . Optional flex acreage (OFA)
covered 10 acres of the 100-acre base.  On these acres,
deficiency payments were made if the farmer planted
4 ✥ S Su up pp pl ly y   R Re es sp po on ns se e   U Un nd de er r   t th he e   1 19 99 96 6   F Fa ar rm m   A Ac ct t/ /T TB B- -1 18 88 88 8 E Ec co on no om mi ic c   R Re es se ea ar rc ch h   S Se er rv vi ic ce e/ /U US SD DA Athe program crop.  Planting flexibility provisions
applied to these acres, but deficiency payments were
forgone for each acre that was switched to an alterna-
tive crop.  Net returns for planting the original pro-
gram crop equaled market returns minus variable costs
plus deficiency payments as shown in equation 3a,
while net returns for planting an alternative crop were
based on market returns for the alternative as in equa-
tion 3b.  Thus, net returns to the alternative crop com-
peted with net returns to the program crop plus pro-
gram payments.  On these 10 acres, program payments
mattered because they affected the planting decision.
(3a) OFA, market returns plus Government payments   
for program crop:
NR = P * Y - VC + D 
(3b) OFA, market returns for alternative competing 
crop:
NR' = P' * Y' - VC'   
N No on nf fl le ex x   A Ac cr re es s. . For the remaining 75 nonflex acres of
the assumed 100-acre base, a program participant’s
planting choices generally were to plant the program
crop on this entire nonflex acreage, or to idle the land
or plant a designated minor oilseed or industrial crop
under 0/85 provisions (fig. 1).  If the entire nonflex
acreage was planted to the program crop, producers
received deficiency payments.  In contrast, 0/85 provi-
sions allowed a producer to devote a part of, or all, the
permitted program crop acreage to conservation uses
and to receive deficiency payments on 85 percent of
the maximum payment acreage.
2 2. .7 75 5   o of f   t th he e   R Re em ma ai in ni in ng g   7 75 5   N No on nf fl le ex x   A Ac cr re es s. For analyti-
cal purposes, the 75 nonflex acres are divided into two
parts, 2.75 acres and 72.25 acres, reflecting features of
the 0/85 program.5
For 2.75 acres of the 75 nonflex acres, deficiency pay-
ments were paid if the farmer planted the program
crop.6 Net returns equaled market net returns plus























(Payment acres = 72.25) 
1
15 NFA 15 NFA
10 OFA
0/85 payment acres
0/85 idled acres  2
Program crop 
planted acres
Acreage designations and payment acres on a 100-acre base farm for different program planting alternatives
1
2
72.25 payment acres under the 0/85 program in this example equal 85 percent of the maximum payment acres under the regular program. 
Equals 12.75 acres, 15 percent of the regular program’s maximum payment acres of 85.
         The regular program




























































































	'()	%		Government payments as in equation 4a. If instead,
the farmer chose to idle this land, there would be no
market receipts, deficiency payments for these acres
were forgone, and there would be a cost associated
with idling the land in a conserving use (equation 4b).
Planting a designated minor oilseed or industrial crop
was not an option on the 2.75 acres (see below).
Thus, Government payments mattered for the planting
decision on this land, since the choice to idle compet-
ed with program payments and the planting of the
base crop.
(4a) Market returns plus Government payments; 
program crop:
NR = P * Y - VC + D 
(4b) Cost of cover crop, if idled:
NR' = - VCC  
7 72 2. .2 25 5   o of f   t th he e   7 75 5   N No on nf fl le ex x   A Ac cr re es s   ( (0 0/ /8 85 5   P Pr ro og gr ra am m) ). .
Because of 0/85 provisions, different net returns affect-
ed the planting decision on 72.25 acres of the 75 non-
flex acres (based on the assumed 100-acre base).
Under the 0/85 program, if a farmer idled at least 15
percent of the maximum payment acres (or planted an
approved crop), deficiency payments would still be
paid on 85 percent of the maximum payment acreage.
For the 0-percent ARP assumed in these examples, the
maximum payment acreage would be 85 acres of the
100-acre base, so 85 percent of the 85 maximum pay-
ment acres would be 72.25 acres.  Planting flexibility
under the 0/85 program applied to these 72.25 acres,
which could be planted to the original program crop,
switched to minor oilseeds and designated industrial
and other crops, or idled, with deficiency payments
still paid.7
If these acres were planted to the program crop, net
returns equaled market receipts plus deficiency pay-
ments minus variable costs of production as shown in
equation 5a.  If the acreage was switched to a permit-
ted alternative crop, net returns equaled market
receipts minus production costs for that crop, plus
deficiency payments of the program crop, as in equa-
tion 5b, with subscripts “a” for the alternative crop.  If
the farmer chose to idle this land, deficiency payments
would still be paid, so net returns equaled those pay-
ments minus the costs associated with idling the land
in a conserving use, as in equation 5c.  Because the
producer received deficiency payments for each
option, whether the acreage was planted to the pro-
gram crop, planted to a permitted alternative crop, or
not planted, the planting decision was based only on
market returns.
(5a) Market returns plus Government payments for    
program crop, if planted to program crop:
NR = P * Y - VC + D  
(5b) Market returns for alternative crop plus 
Government payments for program crop:
NRa = Pa * Ya - VCa + D    
(5c) Government payments minus the cost of cover  
crop, if idled:
NR' = - VCC + D  
Implications for Supply Response Estimation
Net returns analysis of the program participation deci-
sion and of planting choices for various planting
options under 1990 farm legislation have a number of
implications, particularly for the role of Government
payments.  As indicated by the analysis, different net
returns are important for different producer decisions.
Government payments mattered for the whole base
decision to participate in the annual farm programs.
However, once the participation decision was made,
Government payments were largely irrelevant for the
cropping choices for program participants.  The poten-
tial forgoing of payments based on planting decisions
mattered on only 12.75 acres of a 100-acre base once
the participation decision had been made —10 option-
al flex acres and 2.75 nonflex acres that were not cov-
ered by the 0/85 program.  Cropping and idling choic-
es on the rest of the acreage base were determined
largely by market returns. 
This result has important implications for estimating
supply response under the 1990 Act.  Producers make
their acreage allocation decisions by equilibrating net











































%returns at the margin.  Unless a producer is making
this decision at the margin in the 72.25- to 85-acre
portion of the 100- acre base assumed in these exam-
ples, market returns were the producer incentive at the
margin.  Most producers participating in the program
made their acreage allocation decisions for program
crops at the margin in the range of normal flex acreage
during 1991-95 (in response to price signals).8 This
provides the rationale for measuring producers’ supply
response (and deriving elasticities) in this report by
focusing on NFA data.
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Previous and Current 
Related Research
There have been numerous published works on model-
ing supply response in the literature (for example,
Houck and Ryan; Just; Gardner; Lee and Helmberger;
Chavas and Holt; Weaver; Shumway; Coyle; Ball).
However, most of this research dealt with supply
response in the presence of farm commodity programs.
Very few addressed the difference in supply elasticities
between commodity-program and free-market regimes.
One of the few published studies that compares supply
response between commodity-program and free-market
regimes is the study of Lee and Helmberger. A theoret-
ical model was developed to explain a farmer’s optimal
acreage allocation given the option of farm program
participation. Acreage supply response for the free-
market subsample years (1948-49, 1951-53, 1959-60,
1974-77, and 1980) during the 1948-80 period was
estimated. Because of the small sample, time-series
and cross-section data (four States in the Corn Belt)
were pooled and the acreage response equations were
estimated by seemingly unrelated regressions. Because
this study included data prior to the 1981 Act, which
authorized crop-specific base acreage and acreage
reduction program (ARP) provisions, its findings have
little bearing on the current policy environment.
A more recent study that addressed acreage response
under the 1996 Act was conducted by Adams.  This
study made use of normal flex acreage (NFA) data
from 1991-95, because government payments played
no role in planting decisions on this cropland.  Lagged
prices were taken as the expected prices for major field
crops.  The time-series data were pooled with cross-
section (three to five production regions) data to esti-
mate acreage price elasticities on flex acreage.  The
acreage response equations were estimated by ordinary
least squares (OLS) with no theoretical constraints
(linear homogeneity and symmetry—see later discus-
sion) imposed.  The acreage price elasticities for the
whole farm under the 1996 Act are estimated to lie
between the elasticities estimated for entire plantings
to a crop in the 1991-95 period and those estimated for
the crop based on farmers’ use of NFA.  In the Corn
Belt, for example, the corn own-price acreage elastici-
ty under the 1996 Act is estimated at 0.372 in the
Adams study, which lies between the 0.173 estimated
for all plantings for 1991-95 and the 0.673 estimated
for NFA.  The U.S. own-price acreage elasticity for the
whole farm under the 1996 Act was estimated at 0.412
for corn, 0.467 for wheat, 0.364 for soybeans, and
0.634 for cotton.  Each of these elasticities is greater
than that estimated under previous legislation.
McDonald and Sumner recently investigated the influ-
ence of commodity programs on rice acreage response
in the United States.  Their study uses information
about the U.S. deficiency payment program during
1986-95 and relates producer behavior under these
program regimes to what may be expected from pro-
gram crop producers under the new program enacted
in 1996.  The acreage response model developed in
this study recognizes the complexity of the rice pro-
gram and traces through the effects of a price change
on the movement of acres between planting options
and optimal acreage planted to rice within each of the
planting options.  A simulation model was then devel-
oped based on marginal cost curves and was used to
estimate a structural supply elasticity of 1.0 under the
1996 Act.  This estimate is three to four times larger
than the 0.3 acreage price elasticity that was estimated
under the 1991-95 rice program, according to a review
of the literature. 
Holt recently adapted a linear approximate acreage
allocation model within a systems framework that
accounts for yield and price risks.  This model, based
on work by Barten and Vanloot, is used to estimate
acreage supply response on corn normal flex acres
(NFA) for eight States in the Corn Belt for the 1991-
95 period.  The estimates were obtained by first
imposing and testing the theoretical constraints.  New
crop futures prices—December corn futures and
November soybean futures from the Chicago Board of
Trade (CBOT)—were taken as expected prices in
March when producers make planting decisions.
Average futures prices during the previous September
for the July CBOT contract were used for winter
wheat.  These futures prices were adjusted to an equiv-
alent state-level measure by subtracting the average
expected harvest-time state-level basis.  The acreage
allocation model assumes that a representative farmer
maximizes certainty equivalent profit, subject to a total
land constraint.  Variations in output price and crop
yield are two important sources of risk that are explic-
itly factored into producers’ planting decisions in the
modeling framework.  The own-price acreage elasticity
for NFA is estimated at 1.04 for corn and 1.54 for soy-
beans, generally higher than previous estimates report-
ed in the literature.E Ec co on no om mi ic c   R Re es se ea ar rc ch h   S Se er rv vi ic ce e/ /U US SD DA A S Su up pp pl ly y   R Re es sp po on ns se e   U Un nd de er r   t th he e   1 19 99 96 6   F Fa ar rm m   A Ac ct t/ /T TB B- -1 18 88 88 8 ✥ 9
Analytical Framework for 
Modeling Acreage Response
The theoretical underpinning of supply response
assumes that producers wish to maximize expected net
returns, the difference between expected market rev-
enue and variable costs of production.  Based on the
firm’s implicit, multiproduct production function, it
can be shown that the supply of a farm commodity is a
function of output and input prices for that commodity,
as well as output and input prices for competing crops
(Willott and others).
This study utilizes State-level NFA data from 1991-95
to estimate regional supply response.  For each pro-
gram crop (except rice), acreage response on NFA is
analyzed for major production regions.  All acreage
response equations within a region are treated as a sys-
tem of acreage allocation decisions, similar to the
equations estimated by Holt.  Effects of imposing the-
oretical constraints—symmetry and linear homogene-
ity—were then considered.9 These constraints are
derived from a theoretical framework developed by
Barten and Vanloot that allocates land input among
crops to maximize profit, subject to a total land con-
straint.  For purposes of illustration, let’s assume a sys-
tem based on a hypothetical situation in the Midwest
which contains acreage share equations for corn, soy-
beans, and wheat as follows:
Sc = a11 + b11 NRTc + b12 NRTs + b13 NRTw
Ss = a21 + b21 NRTc + b22 NRTs + b23 NRTw
Sw = a31 + b31 NRTc + b32 NRTs + b33 NRTw
where Sc = the percentage of the program crop NFA
planted to corn,
Ss = the percentage of the program crop NFA 
planted to soybeans,
Sw = the percentage of the program crop NFA
planted to wheat,
NRTc = expected net returns ($/ac.) for corn,
NRTs = expected net returns ($/ac.) for soy-
beans, and
NRTw = expected net returns ($/ac.) for 
wheat.
The symmetry restriction requires that cross-net return
coefficients across the equations be equal, that is,
b21 = b12,b 31 = b13, and b32 = b23.  This means
that, for example, the percentage point change in corn
acreage associated with a 1-unit change in expected
soybean net returns equals the percentage point change
in soybean acreage associated with a 1-unit change in
expected corn net returns.  
In addition, the linear homogeneity constraint requires
that
b13 =  - (b11 + b12 )
b23 =  - (b21 + b22 ) 
b33 =  - (b31 + b32)
In other words, the sum of all own- and cross-return
coefficients in each of the three equations must be
zero.  This simply reflects the fact that the profit func-
tion is linear homogenous in output and input prices,
which, intuitively, means that net returns would
increase by the same proportion if both output and
input prices increase by a fixed proportion.  The share
of the program crop NFA, however, is homogenous of
degree zero in prices, since the same proportional
changes in net returns for the program crop and com-
peting crops will not alter the share of NFA planted to
a specific crop. 
Acreage responses on the program crop NFA are esti-
mated by Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) as
a system, which is asymptotically equivalent to maxi-
mum likelihood. The acreage response associated
with a farm commodity is a function of expected net
returns for the primary and competing crops, as illus-
trated in the previous equations and estimated in the
following section. In cases where imposing either of
the theoretical constraints worsened or did not sub-
stantially change the regression results, acreage
response equations without that theoretical constraint
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Supply Response Estimates on NFA
Supply response on program crops’ NFA is estimated
for major program crops (except rice) for the North
Central, Central and Northern Plains, Southern Plains,
Southeast, and Delta regions.10 Farmers’ use of NFA
for a program crop is estimated by pooling time-series
(1991-95) with cross-section (individual States in the
region) data.  As an illustration, this section focuses on
supply response on corn NFA in the North Central
region, which includes eight States (Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and
Wisconsin).  This region accounts for about two-thirds
of U.S. corn production.  The time series are based on
farmers’ use of corn NFA in 1991-95, when planting
decisions were free of restrictions and were based
solely on market incentives.  The pooling provides 40
observations (5 years multiplied by eight States),
which sufficiently overcomes the degrees-of-freedom
problem.
Planting corn NFA to corn, to soybeans, or leaving it
idle were the three most important uses of corn NFA
in the North Central region. During 1991-95, these
three uses accounted for 92 percent of total corn NFA
in the region: 54 percent for planting to corn, 33 per-
cent for planting to soybeans, and 5 percent for leav-
ing NFA idle. The remaining 8 percent of NFA was
planted to other program crops, minor oilseeds,
sorghum, or other crops. Farmers’ use of corn NFA
was treated as a system of land allocation decisions in
this study, encompassing corn NFA planted to corn,
soybeans, other crops, or left idle. This illustration
reports only the estimates of corn NFA planted to corn
and soybeans.
Supply Response Estimates: Model I
We used two modeling approaches, designed to
address issues related to using NFA data for estima-
tion.  In the first model (Model I), the dependent vari-
able is specified as the percent of corn NFA planted to
corn or soybeans.  Explanatory variables include
expected net returns for corn and soybeans, as well as
a set of intercept dummies for seven of the eight States
in the region.  Because the corn-soybean crop rotation
is common in the North Central region, producers are
reluctant to plant NFA to alternative crops, unless the
switching of plantings brings an increase in profits that
exceeds the potential benefit of the crop rotation.11
Expected net returns equal the expected price times the
trend yield by State, minus variable cash costs of pro-
duction for the North Central region.  The expected
prices are derived from the December corn futures
price and the November soybean futures price at the
Chicago Board of Trade in mid-March, the time when
planting decisions are made for corn.  Expected prices
are further adjusted by a State-specific, 5-year average
basis (the difference between the futures prices and
cash prices received by farmers in the delivery month
of the futures), thus arriving at a farm-level equivalent
price.  The trend yield is estimated using data from
1975-95.  The two equations are estimated by
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) with theoreti-
cal constraints—symmetry and linear homogeneity—
imposed, and yield the following estimation results:
(1) Percentage of corn NFA planted to corn:
%NFACR= 51.580  + 0.336 ERTCR - 0.324 ERTSOY
(21.53)    (4.63)              (-4.53)
- 0.012 ERTWH + 6.075 D1 + 5.807 D2 
(-1.54)   (1.67)         (1.81) 
+ 16.135 D3 - 1.886 D4 + 16.333 D5 
(4.89)       (-0.60)           (5.15) 
+ 2.718 D6 - 2.478 D7               
(0.82)       (-0.77)
(2) Percentage of corn NFA planted to soybeans:
%NFASOY=  19.489  - 0.324 ERTCR 
(10.31)  (-4.53)                
+ 0.324 ERTSOY + 17.423 D1 + 16.964 D2 
(3.92)                   (5.85)           (6.79)
+ 6.906 D3 + 8.168 D4 + 4.121 D5
(2.67)         (3.41)         (1.68) 
+ 9.945 D6 + 18.867 D7
(3.78)          (7.47)             
where   %NFACR   =    percentage of corn NFA 
planted to corn








































* ERTCR =    expected net returns for 
corn per acre
ERTSOY    =  expected net returns for 
soybeans per acre
ERTWH     =  expected net returns for 
wheat per acre
D1 through D7 are State dummies for Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, and Ohio,
respectively, leaving Wisconsin as the “base” State.
The figures in parentheses are t-ratios.  All expected
net returns variables and many State dummies are sta-
tistically significant at either the 1- or 5-percent level
of significance. 
Estimated regression results from Model I are shown
by commodity and by production region in appendix
tables 1-7.  The regression equations are estimated by
SUR, which does not significantly alter regression
coefficients from those estimated by OLS, due to the
use of a small sample size, but does increase t-ratios in
some cases.  
Imposing the theoretical restrictions in the estimation
of acreage response on NFA generally improves the
regression results for the North Central and the Central
and Northern Plains regions.  For example, regression
results without these restrictions show that the wheat
expected net returns variable has a positive sign and
statistically significant (with a t-ratio of 2.17) effect on
soybean planted acreage in the North Central region—
an unexpected result that contradicts the expectation of
a negative coefficient because winter wheat competes
with soybeans in this region.  Imposing theoretical
restrictions does not resolve the sign problem for the
wheat net returns variable, but makes the regression
coefficient less than statistically significant (with a
t-ratio of 1.6), which is then excluded in the soybean
acreage response equation in this region (appendix
table 6).  Imposing the theoretical restrictions also
raises t-ratios for several explanatory variables in the
Central and Northern Plains region. 
With few exceptions (sorghum and barley in the
Central and Northern Plains), most of the expected net
returns variables for the program crop itself show a
positive sign and are statistically significant at the 5-
percent level of significance (with t-ratios greater than
2.0).  Nearly all of the regression coefficients for com-
peting crops have the expected negative sign, and
many of them are statistically significant at the 5-per-
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cent level of significance.  However, in the Southeast
and Delta regions, the soybean expected net returns
variable has a positive sign in the wheat acreage equa-
tion, suggesting that higher expected soybean net
returns would lead to greater wheat seedings, due to a
common practice of soybeans-wheat double cropping
in these regions (appendix table 1). 
Percent NFA Planted as Dependent Variable
Provides Lower Bound Estimates
Specifying the dependent variable in the acreage
response equation as the percent of NFA planted to
corn may result in measurement problems relative to
the underlying acreage shifts.  Differences in the
planted acreage covered by NFA associated with the
change in ARP levels in the sample period introduce a
downward bias (see explanation below) into the esti-
mated own-price coefficient, suggesting that the corre-
sponding elasticities derived from the previous model
specification represent lower bounds (Westcott, 1997).
The illustrations below provide examples of how this
bias can occur for hypothetical farming situations,
which would then have similar effects for the statisti-
cal measures used in the aggregate analysis.
To illustrate this potential for underestimating supply
response, a representative farm with a 100-acre corn
base is assumed.  With a 0-percent ARP, the NFA cov-
ers the 86th through the 100th acre, the last 15 acres
of the corn base (fig. 3).  If we examine those acres
more closely in figure 4, we can assume that in the
first year the farmer chooses to plant corn on 94 acres
of the 100-acre corn base.  This represents 9 acres of
the 15 normal flex acres or 60 percent of the NFA.
Assume further that, in the following year, price
expectations are lower, so the farmer adjusted plant-
ings downward to 91 acres (fig. 4).  With no change in
the ARP, these plantings represent 6 acres of the 15
normal flex acres or 40 percent of the NFA.  Thus, the
year-to-year change in the percent of NFA planted
measures the farmer’s reduction in plantings.
However, if prices are lower in the second year, a
more restrictive ARP may have been implemented to
assist in reducing large supplies.  If we assume that a
5-percent ARP had been in place for the second year,
normal flex acreage has shifted to reflect the ARP
requirement, and now covers the 81st through 95th
acre (fig. 5).  
Because the farmer plants 91 acres in this example,
the ARP is not restricting his or her planting of corn.
However, these plantings now include 11 acres of
NFA, representing 73 percent of the NFA (fig. 6).  In
this case, the producer’s decision to lower plantings in
response to lower prices is measured as an increase in
the percent of NFA planted—from 60 percent to 73
percent.  The effects of varying ARP levels on the cal-
culation of the percent-NFA measure can result, as
shown in this example, in an increase in this vari-




Supply function--Normal flex acres (NFA) with a 0-percent Acreage Reduction Program 
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Supply function--Normal flex acres (NFA) planting examples, 







0 25 50 80 95
ARP 
Figure 5
Supply function--Normal flex acres (NFA) with a 5-percent Acreage Reduction Programable—even when plantings actually fell in total on 
that farm (from 94 to 91 acres in this example).  This
effect diminishes the positive relationship between
price and acreage and results in a downward bias in
the elasticity estimate, suggesting that the implied
elasticity should be interpreted as a lower bound.
Supply Response Estimates: Model II
In the second model (Model II), an alternative depend-
ent variable, defined as the percent of the combined
NFA and ARP acreage, is used to derive estimates
which have an upward bias, providing an upper bound
(explained below). Together, results from Model I and
Model II give a range for the elasticities under investi-
gation.  
The lower bound interpretation of estimates from
Model I, using the dependent variable of percent NFA
planted, results from interaction of NFA acreage with
the year-specific ARP.  A possible adjustment to
address this concern is to incorporate the ARP into the
dependent variable.  One way to do this is to define the
dependent variable as the percentage of the combined
NFA plus ARP land that was planted.  The percentage
of combined corn NFA and ARP planted to corn
(%NFAARPCR) in the acreage response equation,
based on this specification, is estimated as follows:
%NFAARPCR= 36.027 + 0.255 ERTCR 
(9.95)   (4.68)              
- 0.215 ERTSOY - 0.040 ERTWH 
(-3.65)                (-1.34) 
+ 3.696  D1   + 3.664 D2        
(0.75)            (0.77)  
+ 10.126 D3 - 0.639 D4  
(2.04)        (-0.14)   
+ 11.467 D5  + 2.751 D6 - 1.948 D7 
(2.41)        (0.58)       (-0.41)    
Expected net returns are, again, based on futures prices
adjusted for the basis at the State level.  All variables
were defined earlier. 
This alternative reduces the downward bias described
earlier, but does not fully eliminate it.  It also adds a
policy-related upward bias to the measurement of
acreage shifts, as described below.
Alternative Dependent Variable (Model II)
Provides Upper Bound Estimates
To illustrate the upward bias resulting from Model II,
we again use the representative farm with a 100-acre
corn base.  With a 0-percent ARP, NFA covers the 86th
through the 100th acre.  If we assume the producer
plants the full 100-acre base, 15 normal flex acres are
planted, which represent 100 percent of the combined
NFA plus ARP acreage (fig.7).  If we again assume
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Supply function--Normal flex acres (NFA) planting examples,
5-percent Acreage Reduction Program
With a 5-percent ARP
assumed for the
second year, NFA has
shifted down to cover
acres 81 to 95
Second year plantings
of 91 acres are now
11 acres of NFA.  This
represents 73 percent
of NFA.that price expectations for the following year are
lower, the farmer may adjust plantings downward to,
for example, 98 acres as also shown in figure 7.  With
no change in the ARP, these plantings represent 13
acres of the 15 normal flex acres, or 87 percent of the
combined NFA plus ARP acreage.  The year-to-year
change in the percent of NFA plus ARP planted (13
percent in this example) measures the farmer’s reduc-
tion in plantings.  
If, however, the assumed lower prices for the second
year led to an increase in the ARP, dependent variable
measurement problems arise again.  An ARP increase
to 5 percent moves the NFA down to cover the 81st to
the 95th acre (fig. 8).  The 5-percent ARP prohibits the
producer from planting the 98 acres that would be
allowed with a 0-percent ARP while still remaining
within program rules.  Instead, 5 acres must be idled
as a condition for program participation, and 95 acres
are planted to corn.  All 15 normal flex acres are plant-
ed and these plantings represent 75 percent of the
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Supply function--Additional normal flex acres (NFA) planting examples,
5-percent Acreage Reduction Program
With a 5-percent ARP
assumed for the
second year, NFA has
shifted down to cover
acres 81 to 95.
Producer must idle
five acres to participate.
Second year plantings
are now 95 acres; 15
acres are NFA. This
represents 75 percent








First year, 100 acres
are planted; 15 acres
are NFA. This
represents 100 percent
of (NFA + ARP).
Second year 98 acres
are planted; 13 acres
are NFA. This
represents 87 percent
of (NFA + ARP).
Figure 7
Supply function--Additional normal flex acres (NFA) planting examples,
0-percent Acreage Reduction Programcombined NFA plus ARP acreage.  This reduction
from 100 percent of the combined NFA, plus ARP
acreage to 75 percent of the combined NFA plus ARP
acreage, overstates the producer’s response to price.
Some of the measured acreage shift results from the
change in the ARP, but would be attributed to price in
the model estimation.  Thus, model estimates using
this dependent variable should be viewed as providing
an upper bound.
Estimated regression results from Model II (upper
bound) also are shown by commodity and by produc-
tion region in appendix tables 1-7.  As for Model I,
Model II regression equations are estimated by SUR.
Again, imposing the theoretical restrictions in the esti-
mation of acreage response on NFA generally
improves the regression results for the North Central
and Central and Northern Plains regions.  For example,
regression results without these restrictions show that
the soybean expected net returns variable has a posi-
tive sign and highly significant (with a t-ratio of 13.29)
effect on corn plantings in the North Central region—a
result of multicollinearity between corn and soybean
expected net returns (with a correlation coefficient of
0.87).  Without imposing theoretical restrictions, one
might drop the soybean expected net returns variable,
which would ignore the strong competition for crop-
land use between the two principal crops in this
region.  However, imposing the restrictions produces a
coefficient for the soybean net returns variable which
not only has a negative sign (as expected), but also is
statistically significant (with a t-ratio of -3.65).  In
addition, with the restrictions, the coefficient of the
wheat net returns variable has a negative sign and is
modestly significant (with a t-ratio of -1.34) in the
corn NFA acreage response equation.  Without the
restrictions, the variable has an unexpected positive
sign, but is not statistically significant (with a t-ratio 
of 0.71). 
With few exceptions (sorghum and barley in the
Central and Northern Plains), most of the expected net
returns variables for the program crop itself result in
positive signs that are statistically significant (with
t-ratios greater than 2.0).  All of the regression coeffi-
cients for competing crops have the expected negative
sign, and many are statistically significant.  
Relative to Model I, regression coefficients in Model II
are typically larger, suggesting that acreage price elas-
ticities estimated from Model II would be on the high
side (upper bound).  For example, the coefficient for
the wheat net returns variable in the wheat NFA
acreage response equation in the Central and Northern
Plains region is estimated to be 0.359 from Model II,
which is higher than the 0.147 estimated from Model I
(appendix table 1).
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Acreage price elasticities are estimated from produc-
ers’ acreage response on program crop NFA, because
the majority of producers made their 1991-95 planting
decisions, at the margin, within this range.  Again, as
an illustration, we use the case of corn NFA planted to
corn to show how acreage price elasticities are derived
from the estimated corn NFA acreage response equa-
tions in this study.  Acreage price elasticities are
obtained in two steps: (1) by determining the effect of
a 1-percent price (own- and cross-price) change on
corn NFA planted to corn and (2) by extending the
effect on corn plantings to the hypothetical 100-acre
whole farm. 
Estimating Acreage Price Elasticities
Own- and cross-price acreage elasticities are estimated
for all major program crops and soybeans in each of
the major production regions.  The estimate obtained
from Model I (where the dependent variable is speci-
fied as, for example, the percentage of corn NFA
planted to corn) provides a lower bound, while that
derived from Model II (where the dependent variable
is defined as, for example, the percentage of combined
NFA and ARP acreage that was planted to corn) gives
an upper bound.  The midpoint average is reported as
the best estimate of the elasticity in most cases.  In
cases where an explanatory variable occurs in only one
model’s specification, but not in the other model’s, a
simple average is calculated assuming an elasticity of
zero for the latter equation.  An example of this situa-
tion is for wheat acreage response in the Central and
Northern Plains region (appendix table 1), where bar-
ley net returns occur only in Model I, because this
variable has the wrong sign in Model II. 
Own-Price Elasticity  
Using equation 1 of Model I and additional calcula-
tions, corn NFA planted to corn in the North Central
region would increase by 0.0793 acre as the expected
corn price increases by 1 percent, translating into an
acreage price elasticity of 0.9766 for NFA (see box 1,
lines D & E).  The 0.9766 acreage price elasticity
applies only to the corn NFA (15 percent of the base),
and does not necessarily apply to the whole farm.
Given that the corn ARP between 1991 and 1995 aver-
aged 6 percent, this hypothetical 100-acre corn farm
idled 6 acres, and had the flexibility to plant almost
any crop on the 15-acre NFA.  The remaining 79 acres
(known as maximum payment acres) would be planted
to corn (assuming that the 10-percent OFA were plant-
ed to corn as well).
Under the 1996 Act, the elimination of the ARP would
mean a net increase of about 4.8 idled acres in corn
plantings, assuming a 20-percent acreage slippage
(Lin, 1989).12 Adding the 4.8 acres (80 percent of 6
acres) to the 79 acres originally planted to corn gives a
total of 83.8 acres—the acreage this 100-acre corn
farm would plant to corn outside of his or her NFA
acres under the 1996 Act, assuming corn prices remain
unchanged (line F).  As the expected corn price
increases by 1 percent, the corn farm is expected to
expand its corn plantings beyond those 83.8 acres.
Because producers’ acreage response on corn NFA is
already estimated in this study (part I in box 1, p. 17),
the elasticity from a pre-planting flexibility period is
used to capture acreage response for the non-NFA
acres that were guided by non-flexibility provisions.
This approach avoids double counting the effect cap-
tured in the NFA.  Using an acreage price elasticity of
0.159 estimated for corn during the years 1986-90
(Adams) implies an increase of 0.1332 acre on the
non-NFA “rest of base” in response to a 1-percent
increase in the expected corn price (Line G).13
Thus, corn plantings on the whole farm would increase
by 0.2125 acre (see box 1, line H, p. 17) in response to
a 1-percent increase in the expected corn price.  This
represents 0.246 percent of base corn plantings includ-
ing the return of 4.8 acres of ARP cropland to produc-
tion (see box 1, line I, p. 17).  That is, the Model I
acreage price elasticity for corn plantings on the farm
is 0.246.  This elasticity is much smaller than the
0.9766 estimated for corn NFA alone, but is higher
than the 0.173 estimated for the 1991-95 period
(Adams) and the 0.159 estimated for the 1986-90
period (as described above).
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			./ Following the same procedures, the own-price elastici-
ty based on Model II, where percentage of corn NFA
and ARP area planted to corn is used as the dependent
variable, is estimated at 1.013 for corn NFA alone, and
0.250 for the whole farm.
Thus, the own-price elasticity for farms making mar-
ginal planting decisions in the range of NFA lies
between 0.246 (the lower bound) and 0.250 (the upper
bound).14 This represents an increase of 42 to 45 per-
cent over the 0.173 own-price elasticity for corn
reported in Adams for the period 1991-95 (before the
enactment of the 1996 Act), and 55 to 57 percent over
the 0.159 corn elasticity from 1986-90, when there
was almost no planting flexibility under the 1985 Act.
Cross-Price Elasticity on NFA
Following the same procedures, corn plantings on
NFA for this hypothetical corn farm in the North
Central region would decline by 0.0684 acre in
response to a 1-percent increase in the expected soy-
bean price (see line D, box 2, p. 19), and a 
-0.8427 cross-price elasticity is estimated for corn
NFA in Model I (see line E).  To extend the response
to the whole farm, corn plantings outside NFA would
decline by 0.0737 acre based on a cross-price elasticity
of -0.088 in response to a 1-percent change in the
expected soybean price.  The -0.088 elasticity was esti-
mated for the 1986-90 period under 1985 Act provi-
sions (Adams).
Thus, corn plantings for the whole farm would decline
by 0.1421 (0.0684 + 0.0737) acre in response to a 1-
percent increase in the expected soybean price.  This
decline would amount to 0.164 percent of base corn
plantings after allowing for the return of 4.8 acres of
ARP cropland to production.  In other words, the
cross-price elasticity, estimated at -0.164 from Model
I, is smaller (in absolute value) than that measured for
NFA alone, but 86 percent higher than the -0.088 esti-
mated for 1986-90 when planting restrictions were in
effect (Adams).
The cross-price acreage elasticity is estimated at the
same -0.164 for the whole farm from Model II.  Thus,
a -0.164 cross-price elasticity indicates that a decline
of 0.164 percent in corn plantings is associated with a
1-percent increase in the expected soybean price.
Elasticity Results
Three topics are discussed regarding the resulting elas-
ticity calculations.  First, a comparison of elasticities
with and without theoretical restrictions is illustrated.
Second, elasticities are presented by major production
region and by program crop.  Finally, national acreage
price elasticities are presented.
Elasticities With vs.Without Restrictions
Imposing theoretical restrictions on the acreage
response equations has its largest effects on improving
regression results in the North Central and the Central
and Northern Plains regions.  To illustrate the differ-
ences in estimated results, appendix table 8 shows
NFA and whole-farm acreage price elasticities under
the 1996 Act obtained from Model I (lower bound)
and Model II (upper bound) for the North Central
region without theoretical restrictions.  Appendix table
9 presents elasticities estimated for that region with
theoretical restrictions imposed.
A comparison of appendix tables 8 and 9 shows that
theoretical restrictions generally lower the magnitude
of acreage price elasticities (in absolute value).  For
example, corn own-price elasticities on NFA and for
the whole farm in the North Central region are esti-
mated at 1.465 and 0.293 (average of Model I and
Model II results), respectively, when restrictions are
not imposed.  However, these elasticities become
smaller with restrictions imposed in the estimation,
declining to 0.995 on NFA and 0.248 for the whole
farm.
Elasticities by Major Production Region
and by Crop
In addition to the elasticity results shown in appendix
table 9 for the North Central region, appendix tables
10-12 show acreage price elasticities for other regions.
NFA acreage price elasticities mostly are greater than
those for the whole farm because of the planting flexi-
bility allowed on NFA land.  Acreage price elasticities
(whole-farm under the 1996 Act) estimated from this
study generally tend to be somewhat smaller than
those estimated by Adams. 
Appendix tables 13-20 then show acreage price elas-
ticities for each of the eight major field crops (wheat,
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corn, sorghum, barley, oats, soybeans, cotton, and
rice).15 Own- and cross-price acreage elasticities
under the 1996 Act, with its nearly full planting flexi-
bility, are mostly greater than those estimated under
previous legislation, especially compared with elastici-
ties for 1986-90, before planting flexibility was intro-
duced.16 In most cases, cross-price elasticities
increase even more than own-price elasticities.  For
example, while the own-price elasticity for corn plant-
ings in the North Central region increases by 56 per-
cent when the 1996 Act estimates are compared with
1986-90, the cross-price elasticity with respect to a 
1-percent change in the expected soybean price
increases by 86 percent (appendix table 14). 
Relative to elasticities for the 1986-90 period, the own-
price elasticity at the national level increases as fol-
lows: wheat, 1.2 percent; corn, 41.6 percent; soybeans,
13.5 percent; and cotton, 7.9 percent.17 Compared
with elasticities for 1991-95, the own-price elasticity
under the 1996 Act either increases by a smaller
amount or, in the cases of wheat, barley, oats, and soy-
beans in the Central and Northern Plains region,
becomes smaller. 
Wheat
The own-price supply elasticity of U.S. wheat (the
weighted average of regional own-price elasticities
based on the regional share of U.S. wheat planted
acreage in 1991-95) is estimated at 0.340 under the
1996 Act, slightly above the estimate for 1986-90 but
below the estimate for 1991-95 (table 1).  This is in
direct contrast with corn and soybeans, where larger
increases in the own-price acreage elasticity are report-
ed.  This is because corn and soybean producers in the
North Central region have more planting options than
wheat producers in the Great Plains region.  In the
absence of planting flexibility, the own-price elasticity
was estimated at 0.336 for U.S. wheat during 1986-90
(Adams).  Similarly, the wheat own-price elasticity in
the Central and Northern Plains was estimated at 0.240
under the 1996 Act, slightly higher than the 0.201 esti-
mated for the 1986-90 period (appendix table 13).
At the national level, sorghum and barley are found to
be the two primary competing crops for wheat.  For
example, a cross-price elasticity of -0.075 with respect
to the sorghum price means that a 0.075-percent
decline in U.S. wheat planted acreage is associated
with a 1-percent increase in the expected sorghum
price.  This represents an increase of 29 percent and 12
percent over the elasticities estimated for 1986-90 and
1991-95, respectively (table 1).  Corn, cotton, and oats
also are important competing crops, although the
extent of competition depends on the geographic area.  
The own-price elasticity for U.S. winter wheat is esti-
mated at 0.361 under the 1996 Act, compared with
0.291 for U.S. spring wheat.18 Winter wheat confronts
a larger number of competing crops (including
sorghum, corn, barley, soybeans, and cotton) than does
spring wheat (mainly barley, oats, and sorghum), giv-
ing a larger own-price supply elasticity.  Sorghum is
the primary competing crop for winter wheat.
However, barley is the dominant competing crop for
spring wheat.  In the Southeast and Delta regions, a
higher expected soybean price means more wheat
plantings because a higher expected soybean price
tends to encourage more winter wheat and soybean
double-cropping.
Supply elasticities vary among major production
regions.  The own-price elasticity in the Central and
Northern Plains (0.240) is the lowest, while that for
the North Central region (0.567) is the highest (appen-
dix table 13).  The wheat own-price elasticity in the
Central and Northern Plains is the lowest mainly
because producers have limited alternatives to growing
wheat.  In contrast, the elasticity is the highest in the
North Central region because wheat in that area has
more cropping alternatives, competing with corn, soy-
beans, oats, and minor oilseeds.  In the Central and
Northern Plains, where over 50 percent of U.S. wheat
is grown, the own-price elasticity under the 1996 Act
is about 20 percent higher than under the 1986-90 leg-
islation, but slightly below the estimate for 1991-95.
Among the major production regions, the North
Central region has the smallest increase in the own-
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	price elasticity in a comparison with 1986-90—only
2.5 percent.
Corn and Other Feed Grains
Relative to previous legislation, the 0.293 own-price
acreage elasticity for U.S. corn estimated under the
1996 Act is 25-percent higher than during 1991-95 and
42-percent higher than during 1986-90 (table 2).  The
cross-price acreage elasticity with respect to the
expected soybean price (-0.145) under the 1996 Act
shows comparable increases, 27-percent higher than
during the 1991-95 period and 47-percent higher than
during 1986-90.
The own-price elasticity in the Central and Northern
Plains region (0.242) is the lowest among the regions,
while that for the Southeast and Delta regions (0.794)
is the highest (appendix table 14).  A larger number of
competing crops (cotton, soybeans, winter wheat, and
sorghum) in the Southeast and Delta contribute to a
higher acreage price elasticity than in the Central and
Northern Plains region, where competing crops are pri-
marily limited to wheat, soybeans, and sorghum.  In
the North Central region, where nearly two-thirds of
U.S. corn is grown, the own-price elasticity (0.248)
under the 1996 Act is 43 percent higher than under
1991-95 legislation and 56 percent higher than under
1986-90 legislation.  
The cross-price elasticity with respect to the expected
soybean price in the North Central region is 58 percent
higher than during 1991-95 and 86 percent higher than
during 1986-90.  Both of these gains exceed the
respective increases in own-price elasticities in that
region.  The increase in the cross-price elasticity
implies that corn programs in the past might have
restricted the acreage shift from the program crop
(corn) to competing crops (such as soybeans).  While
the 15-percent NFA provided by the 1990 farm legisla-
tion seems adequate for farmers in aggregate to
respond to changing market price signals (Evans),
flexibility limitations may have constrained large
acreage shifts by some producers who would have
switched more acreage had the NFA percent been
higher.  Also, the 1996 Act might facilitate the corn-
soybean rotation, which allows operations that had
previously planted continuous corn, or that had a high-
er proportion of corn than would be desirable for agro-
nomic reasons, to shift to higher soybean plantings.
The greater increase in the soybean cross-price elastic-
ity is consistent with the increasing soybean share of
combined corn-soybean acreage since 1996.   
The own-price elasticity for oats and barley increases
very little over 1986-90 legislation, and becomes
smaller when compared with 1991-95 legislation
(appendix tables 15-17).  The decreases or lack of
apparent increases in the own-price elasticity for these
other feed grains suggest likely shifts of their acreage
to corn, soybeans, or minor oilseeds if expected prices
of these competing crops rise.
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Table 1—Acreage price elasticities for U.S. wheat under the 1996 Act vs. previous legislation
1986-901 1991-951 1996 Act Difference
Item (1) (2) (3) (3) vs. (1) (3) vs. (2) 
Elasticity Percent
Wheat price 0.336 0.410 0.340 +1.2 -17.1
Barley price -.080 -.078 -.076 -5.0 -2.6
Sorghum price -.058 -.067 -.075 +29.3 +11.9
Corn price -.030 -.041 -.046 +53.3 +12.2
Soybean price   -.002  -.007 -.010 +400.0 +42.9
Cotton price -.028 -.029 -.014 -50.0 -51.7
Oat price n.a. n.a. -.011 n.a. n.a.
n.a. = Not applicable.
1Acreage price elasticities for the 1986-90 and 1991-95 periods are from Adams.Soybeans
Supply response estimates for soybeans are derived
from NFA data for competing program crops.  The
own-price acreage elasticity for U.S. soybeans is esti-
mated at 0.269, virtually unchanged from 1991-95 but
14 percent higher than during 1986-90 (table 3).  In
the absence of planting flexibility, the own-price elas-
ticity was estimated at 0.237 for 1986-90.  In the
North Central region, where nearly two-thirds of U.S.
soybeans are grown, the own-price elasticity is esti-
mated at 0.298 under the 1996 Act, 14 percent higher
than during 1991-95 and 17 percent higher than during
1986-90 (appendix table 18). 
Corn is the primary competing crop for soybeans.  The
-0.229 cross-price elasticity with respect to the expect-
ed corn price means that a decline of 0.229 percent in
soybean plantings is associated with a 1-percent
increase in the expected corn price (table 3).  This
magnitude of the impact on soybean plantings is far
greater than that caused by the same percentage
increase in the expected prices for wheat and cotton
combined.
The own-price elasticity of soybean plantings ranges
from 0.20 to 0.30, depending on the production region.
The own-price elasticity is the lowest in the Central
and Northern Plains (0.198), while that for the North
Central (0.298) is the highest (appendix table 18).  The
increase in the own-price elasticity is also the greatest
(17 percent) in the North Central region relative to
1986-90.  To the extent that the 1996 Act may cause
soybean acreage to expand and prices to decline over
time, the largest increase in the own-price elasticity for
the North Central region suggests that soybean plant-
ings would be less concentrated in that region.
Cotton
The own-price supply elasticity of U.S. cotton is esti-
mated at 0.466 under the 1996 Act, 16 percent higher
than during 1991-95, and 8 percent higher than during
1986-90 (table 4).  The increase in cotton’s own-price
elasticity becomes much more pronounced at the
regional level.  In the Southern Plains, where over 40
percent of U.S. cotton is grown, the own-price elastici-
ty is estimated at 0.48, 83 percent higher than during
1991-95, and 39 percent higher than during 1986-90
(appendix table 19).  At the national level, corn, wheat,
sorghum, and soybeans are the primary competing
crops for cotton.  For example, a cross-price elasticity
of -0.072 with respect to the corn price means that a
0.072-percent decline in U.S. cotton planted acreage is
associated with a 1-percent increase in the expected
corn price.  Similarly, the -0.081 cross-price elasticity
with respect to the soybean price means that a 0.081-
percent decline in U.S. cotton plantings is associated
with a 1-percent increase in the expected soybean
price.  While the own-price elasticity shows an
increase of 16.0 percent when compared to 1991-95,
the increase in cross-price elasticities are much more
pronounced.  For example, the increase in the cross-
price elasticity with respect to the corn price is more
than four times.  Much lower capital requirements for
growing competing crops, such as corn and soybeans,
entice cotton producers to more readily make a switch
in their planting decisions than many other crop pro-
ducers.  Also, producers continued to grow cotton to
protect their base under previous legislation because
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Table 2—Acreage price elasticities for U.S. corn under the 1996 Act vs. previous legislation
1986-901 1991-951 1996 Act Difference
Item (1) (2) (3) (3) vs. (1) (3) vs. (2)
Elasticity Percent
Corn price 0.207 0.235 0.293 +41.6 +24.7
Soybean price -.099 -.114 -.145 +46.5 +27.2
Wheat price  -.022 -.024 -.065 +195.5 +170.8
Cotton price -.030 -.026 -.028 -6.7 +7.7
Sorghum price   -.003 -.002 -.010 +233.3 +400.0 
1Acreage price elasticities for the 1986-90 and 1991-95 periods are from Adams.cotton offered one of the largest deficiency payments
on a per acre basis.  
Supply elasticities vary somewhat among major pro-
duction regions.  The own-price elasticity in the
Southeast and Delta (0.435) is slightly lower than the
0.480 for the Southern Plains (appendix table 19).
Relative to 1986-90, the own-price elasticity shows a
larger increase in the Southern Plains—an increase of
39.1 percent.  In contrast, the own-price elasticity
shows only a 6.1-percent increase in the Southeast and
Delta regions.  This suggests that cotton plantings
under the 1996 Act associated with a decline in cotton
prices would fall relatively less in the Southeast and
Delta regions than in the Southern Plains.
National Acreage Price Elasticity Summary 
U.S. acreage price elasticities are summarized in
appendix table 21 to indicate the acreage responses for
major field crops to 1-percent changes in their own
prices and prices for competing crops.  These U.S.
acreage price elasticities are weighted averages of the
elasticities in major production regions based on the
regional shares of U.S. planted acreage for each crop
in 1991-95.
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Table 3—Acreage price elasticities for U.S. soybeans under the 1996 Act vs. previous legislation
1986-901 1991-951 1996 Act Difference
Item (1) (2) (3) (3) vs. (1) (3) vs. (2)
Elasticity Percent
Soybean price 0.237 0.271 0.269 +13.5  -0.7
Corn price -.172 -.230 -.229 +33.1 -.4
Wheat price  .007 -.007 -.007 -200.0  0
Cotton price -.044 -.040 -.020 -54.6 -50.0
1Acreage price elasticities for the 1986-90 and 1991-95 periods are from Adams.
Table 4—Acreage price elasticities for U.S. cotton under the 1996 Act vs. previous legislation
1986-901 1991-951 1996 Act Difference
Item (1) (2) (3) (3) vs. (1) (3) vs. (2)
Elasticity Percent
Cotton price 0.432 0.401 0.466 +7.9 +16.2
Corn price -.019 -.014 -.072 +278.9 +414.3
Wheat price  -.026  -.035 -.058 +123.1 +65.7
Sorghum price -.085 -.076 -.103 +21.2 +35.5
Soybean price -.046  -.034 -.081 +76.1 +138.2
1Acreage price elasticities for the 1986-90 and 1991-95 periods are from Adams.Impact of the 1996 Act on the U.S.
Major Field Crops Sector
This section describes simulations based on the Policy
Analysis System-Economic Research Service (POLY-
SYS-ERS) model jointly developed by ERS and the
Agricultural Policy Analysis Center, University of
Tennessee, and discusses impacts of increased planting
flexibility under the 1996 Act on the major U.S. field
crops.
POLYSYS Simulation Procedures
POLYSYS is a simulation modeling framework that
provides policy analysts and researchers with an ana-
lytical tool for estimating a variety of impacts resulting
from policy, economic, environmental, or other
changes.  Based on a systems approach to modeling,
POLYSYS operates an umbrella framework, facilitat-
ing the interaction of agricultural supply, demand, and
income modules (Ray and others).  POLYSYS is
designed to anchor its analysis to a baseline of projec-
tions for all model variables.  This design, along with
reliance on predetermined price-response parameters,
allows POLYSYS to produce detailed and complex
estimates quickly.
Within the linear programming (LP) supply framework
of POLYSYS, agricultural production response and
resource use indicators are disaggregated to 305
regions, each of which is characterized by homoge-
neous production characteristics within the region.
Based on expected prices, the supply module—a set of
305 regional LP models maximizing returns above
variable costs—estimates planted and harvested acres,
yields, and production costs.  The aggregation of crop
production by region results in national crop produc-
tion which, together with beginning stocks and any
imports, provides an estimate of supply.  The demand
module estimates domestic demand, exports, and end-
ing stocks at the national level for each crop.  Supply
of the commodity is then fed into the demand compo-
nent of POLYSYS as a fixed number to generate the
market-clearing price based on a set of price flexibility
functions for each crop.  The market-clearing price is
then recursively fed into LP models to solve for plant-
ed and harvested acres for the following year and the
simulation process continues through the year 2005.
In this analysis, the impact of the 1996 Act (through
planting flexibility) at both the national and regional
levels is determined by comparing the results of the
baseline that reflects the 1990 Act with an alternate
scenario that reflects the increased planting flexibility
under the 1996 Act. The 1996 Act scenario explicitly
incorporates the acreage price elasticities under the
new legislation (reported earlier) and completely revis-
es the price flexibility functions for U.S. wheat, corn,
other feed grains, soybeans, cotton, and rice previous-
ly reported by Ray and others so that they are consis-
tent with the current policy environment (appendix
table 22).
“Price flexibility” refers to the percentage change in
commodity farm prices associated with a 1-percent
change in quantity demanded, moving along the
demand function.  The slope of the price flexibility
function may vary, depending on the stocks-to-use
ratio.  More specifically, a higher slope is associated
with the stocks-price relationship at a low stocks-to-
use ratio, and a lower slope occurs at a high stocks-to-
use ratio.  Price flexibility functions for corn, wheat,
soybeans, cotton, and rice are estimated using the fol-
lowing steps: (1) obtain the stocks-to-price relation-
ships for corn, as estimated by Westcott and Hoffman,
that are consistent with the current policy environment
of lower loan rates and only small Government-owned
stocks; (2) estimate the stocks-to-use relationships for
wheat, soybeans, cotton, and rice, following the same
basic approach as used in estimating corn by Westcott
and Hoffman; and (3) calculate price flexibilities at
various stocks-to-use ratios based on the stocks-price
relationships obtained in step 1 and estimated in step
2.  The newly estimated price flexibility functions lie
below the ones embedded in the earlier version of
POLYSYS (fig. 9).  For example, at a stocks-to-use
ratio of 19 percent (a point in the 15- to 20-percent
range as shown in appendix table 22) for U.S. corn, a
price flexibility of -2.00 is estimated according to the
newly estimated price flexibility function for corn,
compared with the -2.75 used in the earlier version of
POLYSYS.  
Several important changes are made in the POLYSYS
framework to include the new supply response struc-
ture used in the simulation analyses presented here.
Also, various specific assumptions are employed in the
simulation analysis.  The key steps (and assumptions)
in the POLYSYS simulation include:
• Use the February 1996 USDA baseline (the
last baseline that reflects the 1990 FarmAct)
as the base scenario for this analysis. This base
line, reflecting stronger market conditions for
major field crops than more recent, low-price
markets, serves as the benchmark for compar-
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Act scenario with the 1990Act baseline.
• Generate the regional acreage that corresponds
with the February 1996 USDA baseline from 
the LP supply component to obtain the region-
al benchmarks.  Estimates of acreage, input 
expenditures, crop yields, season average 
prices, and Government program variables in 
the February 1996 USDA baseline are disag-
gregated into the seven production regions.  
The regional LP models are used to allocate 
acreage in the February 1996 USDA baseline 
among the seven regions, given regional 
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• Use farm prices lagged by 1 year as expected 
prices for the current year, and determine 
planted acreage for the current year by the 
change in expected prices and acreage price 
elasticities.
• Determine market-clearing prices by adjusting 
the baseline numbers by multiplying the per-
centage change in total use by the revised 
price flexibilities (appendix table 22) 
estimated by ERS analysts.
Simulation Results
Simulation results presented show crop-specific and
aggregate acreage impacts for individual regions and
the national level.  Price effects, which provide
dynamic price-output linkages in the simulation
model, are also presented. 
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Figure 9  
Price flexibility functions for U.S. corn: Old vs. new scheduleAggregate Area Planted to the Eight Major
Field Crops
The simulation results reaffirm earlier studies indicat-
ing that aggregate area planted to the eight major field
crops (wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, oats, soybeans,
cotton, and rice) under the 1996 Act would not differ
much from that under the 1990 Act (Young and
Westcott). Plantings are projected to increase to 261.7
million acres by the year 2005 under the 1996 Act (fig.
10). In contrast, plantings would have been about 2
million acres higher (263.6 million acres) by the year
2005 if the 1990 Act provisions had continued in force.
Aggregate area planted to the eight major field crops
in the simulations was initially about 1 million acres
lower under the 1996 Act scenario than under the 1990
Act baseline in 1996, reflecting the discrepancy
between acreage projected in the February 1996
USDA baseline (reflecting 1990 farm law) and farm-
ers’ 1996 crop planting intentions at the end of March
1996 (fig. 10).  Then, for 1998 through 2002, aggre-
gate area planted to the eight major field crops under
the 1996 Act scenario exceeds that projected under the
1990 Act baseline, reflecting greater supply response
to rising farm prices under the 1996 Act scenario.
After 2002, aggregate planted area continues to rise
under the 1990 Act baseline, but area under the 1996
Act scenario increases more slowly in response to
more modest increases in farm prices for corn and
wheat—the two major program crops where acreage
expands under the 1990 Act baseline.  Thus, by 2005,
aggregate planted area under the 1996 Act scenario is
projected to be about 2 million acres less than planted
under the 1990 Act baseline.
Wheat
Wheat acreage could be affected significantly by the
size and composition of the Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP), because a large portion of the crop-
land enrolled in the CRP is wheat land.  However,
because acreage enrolled under the CRP in the 1996
Act scenario remains unchanged from that under the
1990 Farm Act baseline, the impact of the 1996 Farm
Act on the U.S. wheat sector mainly reflects the effect
of enhanced planting flexibility, not the CRP.
The effect of changing farm legislation on the U.S.
wheat industry appears to be less dramatic than its
effect on the corn, soybeans, and cotton sectors.  U.S.
wheat planted acreage under the 1996 Act scenario is
simulated to decline by 1-2 million acres during 1997-
98, reflecting the significant reduction in Export
Enhancement Program funding and consequently the
reduction in wheat exports (fig. 11).  Wheat plantings
then regain strength to slightly exceed the 1990 Act
baseline acreage during 2000-02, reflecting higher sea-
son average farm prices under the 1996 Act scenario
during the 1998-99 crop years (fig. 12).  Due to larger
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Figure 10acreage, market-clearing prices are simulated to fall,
which triggers a decline in wheat planted acreage.  By
the year 2005, U.S. wheat acreage under the 1996 Act
is simulated to be 0.8 million acres lower than under
the 1990 Act.
This reduction in U.S. wheat acreage simulated under
the 1996 Act has different incidences for major pro-
duction regions.  The reduction in wheat acreage is
greatest in the Southern Plains, a decline of 0.67 mil-
lion acres.  Similarly, wheat acreage in the Central and
Northern Plains is simulated to decrease by 0.45 mil-
lion acres, about half of the 0.8-million-acre decline in
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Figure 12
Farm prices of wheat, 1990 Act baseline and 1996 Act
Dollars/bushelU.S. wheat planted acreage under the 1996 Act. This
share reflects the 53.8 percent of wheat acreage
accounted for by this region during 1994-95.  In con-
trast, wheat acreage is shown to increase by 0.39 mil-
lion acres under the 1996 Act in the North Central
region.
U.S. wheat prices are simulated to be higher in the late
1990’s under the 1996 Act scenario than under the
1990 Act baseline, reaching a 6-cent per bushel rise in
the 1998 crop year.  Wheat prices are projected to be
lower during 2000-03 as planted acreage becomes
larger than under the 1990 Act baseline, and then to
increase by 6-10 cents per bushel during 2004-05.  On
average, U.S. wheat prices under the 1996 Act are
comparable with those under the 1990 Act.  This find-
ing suggests that the current low wheat prices received
by farmers (for example, cash grain bids of U.S. No. 1
hard red winter (HRW) wheat at country elevators in
western Kansas were priced at $2.17-$2.25 per bushel
as of April 12, 2000) are a phenomenon caused more
by large wheat crop production in the United States
and in foreign markets, and the financial crisis in Asia,
than by implementation of the 1996 Act. 
Due to small changes in acreage price elasticities
between the 1996 Act and 1990 Act across production
regions, regional production patterns for U.S. wheat
would remain largely unchanged.  The Central and
Northern Plains remains the most important production
region for U.S. wheat, and its share of U.S. wheat
acreage under the 1996 Act stays about 54 percent.
The North Central region would likely marginally gain
in its share of U.S. wheat acreage, by an average of 0.5
percentage point per year during 1996-2005, at the
expense of the Southern Plains.  Because of higher
costs of production on a per bushel basis, the Southern
Plains is likely to have a slightly reduced competitive
edge in wheat production under the 1996 Act.  The
share of U.S. wheat acreage in the Southeast and Delta
regions would remain unchanged.
Corn
The change in farm legislation from the 1990 Act to
the 1996 Act will have a bigger impact on the U.S.
corn industry than on the wheat industry.  During the
simulation period, 1996-2005, U.S. corn planted
acreage under the 1996 Act scenario, on average, is
projected to be 1-2 million acres lower than under the
1990 Act baseline (fig. 13).  More important, U.S. corn
acreage under the 1996 Act is simulated to be less than
under the 1990 Act baseline in every year of the 1996-
2005 simulation period.  By the years 2004-05, U.S.
corn acreage under the 1996 Act scenario is projected
to be about 2 million acres less than under the 1990
Act baseline.  With greater supply response under the
1996 Act, producers can more readily make a switch
from corn to soybeans, or other competing crops.
As a result of lower planted acreage, farm prices for
U.S. corn under the 1996 Act scenario are projected to
be 10-15 cents per bushel higher than under the 1990
Act baseline (fig. 14).  In the initial years of the simu-
lation period, corn prices under the 1996 Act are pro-
jected to be about 10 cents per bushel higher than
under the 1990 Act baseline, reflecting a slightly lower
stocks-to-use ratio (9 percent) under the 1996 Act sce-
nario than under the 1990 Act baseline (10 percent).
However, beginning in the early 2000’s, the gap is pro-
jected to widen, reaching a difference of 16 cents per
bushel by the year 2005.  The stocks-to-use ratio is
projected to be at 6 percent for that year under the
1996 Act scenario, compared with  7 percent under the
1990 Act baseline. 
U.S. corn production will be slightly more concentrat-
ed in the North Central region, which accounts for
nearly two-thirds of U.S. corn acreage.  That region
has a larger increase in own-price elasticity than in
other regions, and projections indicate higher corn
prices under the 1996 Act than under the previous leg-
islation.  Relative to the region’s estimated elasticity of
0.173 for 1991-95 (Adams), the own-price elasticity
estimated under the 1996 Act of 0.248 for this region
indicates a 43.4-percent increase.  This increase is the
largest among major production regions. However, the
change in the region’s share of U.S. corn acreage is
small.  In addition, the Southeast and Delta regions are
projected to gain a larger share of U.S. corn acreage at
the expense of the Central and Northern Plains (fig.
15).  In fact, corn acreage in the Central and Northern
Plains is lower under the 1996 Act than under the 1990
Act baseline.
More specifically, corn plantings in the Central and
Northern Plains are projected to continue their expan-
sion trend in the 1990 Act baseline simulation, increas-
ing from 17.4 million acres in the year 1996 to 18.4
million by 2005.  However, the region’s corn acreage
is projected to be lower under the 1996 Act scenario,
remaining near 16.9 million acres (fig. 16).  Since U.S.
corn acreage is projected to be smaller under the 1996
Act, planting flexibility would permit producers to
switch from corn to competing crops (primarily soy-
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Figure 15
The 1996 Act continues corn production concentration in the North Central region, and the South gains
















The 1996 Act slows corn-acreage expansion in the Central and Northern Plainsbeans), if they are more profitable.  As a result, corn
acreage expansion projected to occur under the 1990
Act baseline would be substantially slowed under the
1996 Act scenario.
Soybeans
The change in farm legislation from the 1990 Act to
the 1996 Act will have its biggest acreage impact on
soybeans, which shows an increase of over 2 million
acres throughout the simulation period under the 1996
Act over the 1990 Act baseline (fig. 17).  Nearly full
planting flexibility allows corn producers to make a
switch from corn to soybeans, which is based primari-
ly on market signals in the simulations.  This finding is
consistent with the steady rising trend in the soybean
share of U.S. soybean-corn acres in recent years, from
nearly 44 percent in 1996 to 45.8 percent in 1997, and
to nearly 49 percent in 1999. 
In contrast to corn prices, soybean prices are projected
to be lower under the 1996 Act by about 35 cents per
bushel in 2000-05 (fig. 18).  During this period, corn
prices are projected to be 10-15 cents per bushel high-
er under the 1996 Act scenario.  Soybean prices initial-
ly show a decline of about 10-20 cents per bushel dur-
ing 1996-97.  However, the gap is simulated to widen
afterwards, reaching a difference of more than 20 cents
per bushel in the 1998 crop year.  The lower soybean
prices reflect the projected increase in soybean acreage
under the 1996 Act throughout the simulation period.
The 1996 Act would make soybean production slightly
less concentrated in the North Central region. The
own-price elasticity shows the largest increase (14 per-
cent) under the 1996 Act when compared with 1991-
95 in this region. Since the 1996 Act shows an expan-
sion of soybean acreage and consequently a decline in
soybean prices, the largest increase in the own-price
elasticity for the North Central region suggests that
U.S. soybean plantings would be less concentrated in
that region. This region’s share of U.S. soybean
acreage is projected to be around 66.1 percent to 66.3
percent under the 1990 Act baseline, but would decline
to 65.2 percent to 65.4 percent under the 1996 Act
(fig. 19).
The 1996 Act would facilitate soybean expansion in
the Central and Northern Plains (fig. 20).  Under the
1996 Act scenario, soybean plantings in this region are
projected to be 0.2-0.4 million acres higher than under
the 1990 Act baseline.  Planting flexibility would per-
mit producers to switch from corn to soybean plant-
ings, giving the result of lower U.S. corn acreage and
larger soybean acreage projected under the 1996 Act
scenario.
Cotton
During 1996-2005, upland cotton acreage on average
is projected to be 15.2 million acres under the 1996
Act (fig. 21).  Relative to the 1990 Act baseline,
upland cotton acreage would average 0.7 million acres
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The 1996 Act makes soybean production slightly less concentrated in the North Central region
Percent






































1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005
1990 Act baseline 1996 Act
Figure 21
Cotton planted acreage, 1990 Act baseline and 1996 Act
Crop year beginning August 1higher under the 1996 Act scenario, largely reflecting
the effect of eliminating the ARP, which was projected
to account for between 0.3 to 1.0 million acres under
the 1990 Act baseline.20 During the 1996-2005 simu-
lation period, about 0.6 million acres per year are pro-
jected to be idled under the ARP in the 1990 Act
baseline.  These idled acres would most likely return
to cotton production under the 1996 Act scenario.
Larger upland cotton acreage under the 1996 Act
results in higher stocks-to-use ratios for cotton under
the current policy environment.  The ratio is simulated
to show a rapid upturn before the year 2000—increas-
ing from 26 percent in 1996 to 43 percent in the year
1999—and then to gradually decline to 37 percent by
the year 2005.  In contrast, the ratio is projected to
hover around the range of 27-31 percent under the
1990 Act baseline.
Due to higher stocks-to-use ratios under the 1996 Act
scenario, cotton prices are simulated to remain lower
than under the 1990 Act baseline.  Despite lower
prices, cotton acreage under the 1996 Act scenario
remains consistently higher than the 1990 Act baseline
because of the elimination of the ARP. 
The 1996 Act is found to have a more noticeable
impact on regional production patterns for cotton than
for other major field crops.  The Southeast stands to
gain a larger share of U.S. cotton acreage under the
1996 Act—an increase of 2 percentage points over the
1990 Act level—at the expense of the Southern Plains
and Delta, whose share is projected to decline by 1
percentage point each (fig. 22).  
These changes in regional production patterns are con-
sistent with the changes in cotton’s own-price acreage
elasticities.  The Southeast gains share because the
increase in the elasticity—from 0.419 estimated by
Adams for 1991-95 under the 1990 Act to 0.435 under
the 1996 Act—is smallest in this region (+0.016).
This gives a small decline in this region’s cotton
acreage resulting from lower cotton prices projected
under the 1996 Act.  In contrast, the Southern Plains is
projected to lose share because its own-price elasticity
has the greatest increase (+0.217)—from 0.263 esti-
mated by Adams for 1991-95 under the 1990 Act to
0.480 under the 1996 Act, resulting in a larger decline
in this region’s cotton acreage in response to lower
projected cotton prices.  In addition, the changes in
regional production patterns are consistent with the
costs of production—the Southeast is a low-cost region
while the Southern Plains and Delta are higher cost
regions.
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The Southeast gains a larger share of U.S. cotton acreage under the 1996 Act
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Elasticities and Simulation Results
The validity of these simulation results would be great-
ly enhanced if (1) the acreage price elasticities embed-
ded in the 1996 Act scenario accurately “forecast” pro-
ducers’ planting intentions for major field crops in
1997-99, and (2) the effect of change in the farm pro-
gram (through increased planting flexibility) from the
1990 Act baseline to the 1996 Act scenario, as report-
ed earlier in the simulation analysis section, remains
unchanged when market conditions embedded in the
February 1996 USDA baseline (high-priced) are
replaced with market conditions that actually occurred
during 1997/98 and 1998/99 (low-priced).
If the results track reasonably well, we anticipate that
the program effects reported in the simulation results
section, together with the market effect based on actual
market conditions, will explain producers’ planting
intentions in cases where nonprice factors did not play
an important role in affecting producers’ planting deci-
sions.  In addition, if this is the case, then we have rea-
son to believe that the program effect would remain
largely the same despite the change in market condi-
tions from the higher-price 1990 Act baseline (reflect-
ed in the February 1996 USDA baseline) to the low-
price market situation of the late 1990’s. 
Comparisons Between Model Acreage
Forecasts and March Planting Intentions,
1997-99
To assess the validity of the acreage price elasticities
estimated in this study, those elasticities were used to
forecast March planting intentions for major field
crops under the 1996 Act policy environment.  The
change from 1995/96 to 1996/97 is difficult to repli-
cate, in part, because the change in policy regime was
taking place at the same time that many planting
choices were being made.  To avoid this difficulty, the
comparison is confined to 1997-99.  We compared
acreage forecasts generated with the new acreage price
elasticities and farmers’ planting intentions released by
USDA at the end of March.  Model estimates use new-
crop futures prices observed at planting time as the
basis for price expectations.
Model acreage forecasts presented here are strictly
based on acreage price elasticities estimated in this
report, leaving the deviation between March intentions
and model forecasts to be explained by nonprice fac-
tors and model errors.  Comparisons for the 1999 crop
are highlighted with illustrations here because they
represent the most interesting test of the estimated
acreage price elasticities in a low-price environment.
The acreage response model (based on the acreage
price elasticities) generally performs well in forecast-
ing (1) aggregate planting intentions for four major
field crops and (2) plantings for individual field crops
in cases where nonprice factors did not play an impor-
tant role in producers’ planting intentions. 
In the aggregate, the acreage response model forecast
229.1 million acres of total plantings for the four
major field crops (wheat, corn, soybeans, and cotton)
in 1999, compared with the 228.3-million-acre plant-
ing intentions, as reported in USDA’s March 1999
planting intentions report, a deviation of 0.35 percent
(table 5).  An important factor that might have con-
tributed to the difference is a net increase of about
1.25 million acres enrolled in the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP) between 1998 and 1999.  If
the acreage model result is adjusted for the effects of
the 1.25-million-acre increase in CRP enrollment on
cropland availability, the adjusted model result would
be 227.86 million acres, only 0.2 percent different
from the March planting intentions.  Based on new
crop futures prices at planting time, farm prices for the
four major field crops were expected to decline by an
average of 14.6 percent from 1998 to 1999.  The
acreage response model indicated an expected decline
of 1.7 percent in planting intentions for the four major
field crops—to 229.11 million acres.
The model performs equally well for 1998, but the
deviation between March intentions and model fore-
casts is greater for 1997, reaching 2.45 percent.  A
large portion of the deviation between the model fore-
casts and the March planting intentions is attributed to
nonprice factors not reflected in the model.  For exam-
ple, agronomic practices, weather, and increased yield
risk all played an important role in reducing winter
wheat plantings in 1997.
Winter Wheat
Winter wheat seeded area in 1999 was estimated by
USDA in the March planting intentions report to total
43.4 million acres—the smallest since 1972 and down
7 percent from the 46.6 million estimated for 1998
(USDA, 1999).  The most significant factor contribut-
ing to the decline was a lower wheat price expected by
producers, especially for soft red winter (SRW) wheat.
Based on July 1999 new-crop futures prices at Kansas
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farm price for 1999-crop hard red winter (HRW)
wheat was estimated to decline 13.6 percent from
1998.  The expected price for soft red winter (SRW)
wheat based on July 1999 new-crop futures at Chicago
was projected to decline even more—19.6 percent.
Thus, the weighted-average expected price for winter
wheat was estimated to decline 15.4 percent.  Given
the own-price elasticity of 0.383 for winter wheat
plantings (Lin, 1999a), the reduction in the expected
wheat price implied a decline of about 6 percent in
winter wheat seedings from 1998, or about 2.75 mil-
lion acres (based only on own-price effects).
The decline in expected prices of competing crops
partly offsets the effect on winter wheat seedings due
to the decline in the expected price for winter wheat
itself.  For winter wheat producers, the decline in
expected prices for competing crops based on new-
crop futures prices in mid-October 1998 were 8 per-
cent for sorghum and corn, 6 percent for barley, 13
percent for soybeans, and 2 percent for cotton.21 The
decline in the expected price of these competing crops
altogether is estimated to add about 0.36 million acres
to winter wheat seedings.
Including both own- and cross-price effects together,
the acreage response model suggests a decline of
2.39 (2.75 - 0.36) million acres in winter wheat
acreage from 1998, compared with a decline of 3.24
million acres estimated by USDA in March 1999.
Thus, the model projected winter wheat acreage to
total 44.25 million acres—2.0 percent more than the
43.4 million acres estimated by USDA in March.
Because March planting intentions include producers’
response to nonprice factors as well, the discrepancy
could be attributed to the effect on wheat plantings of
poor weather that would have prevented the seeding of
some HRW acres and an increase in CRP enrollment
from wheat land.
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Table 5—Comparisons between model acreage forecasts and March planting intentions
Crop March intentions Model forecast Deviation 
Million acres Percent
1997
Winter wheat 48.23 49.94 +3.55
Spring wheat 20.96 20.23 -   .73
Corn 81.42 78.77 - 3.25
Soybeans 68.80 63.60 - 7.56
Cotton 14.48 15.62 +7.87
Subtotal 233.89 228.16 -  2.45
1998
Winter wheat 46.64 49.38 +2.74
Spring wheat 20.39 21.26 +4.27
Corn 80.78 81.79 +1.25
Soybeans 72.00 67.64 - 6.06
Cotton 13.22 14.19 +7.34
Subtotal 233.03 234.26 +  .61
1999
Winter wheat 43.40 44.25 +1.96
Spring wheat 19.63 20.02 +1.99
Corn 78.22 79.76 +1.54
Soybeans 73.11 71.63 -2.02
Cotton 13.94 13.45 -3.50






























		The deviation between model forecasts and March
intentions was greater for 1997 and 1998 winter wheat
plantings, reaching 3.6 and 2.7 percent, respectively.
HRW wheat area seeded in 1998 declined from 1997
levels due primarily to unfavorable weather conditions
and an increase of wheat land in CRP enrollment.
Virtually all HRW States planted less 1998-crop wheat
than they did in 1997.  Poor weather prevented some
plantings in Montana, which reduced 1998 winter
wheat plantings to 1.4 million acres, down from 2.2
million in 1996 and 1.6 million in 1997.  Heavy win-
terkill during 1995-96 and good returns for corn and
soybeans reportedly reduced incentives to plant winter
wheat (USDA, 1998a).  HRW seeded area in Kansas
alone was down 700,000 acres from 1997, reflecting
chiefly weather-related effects.  Several States “rang-
ing from Arkansas to South Carolina did not get all of
the previously intended winter wheat in because of wet
weather...” (USDA, 1998b).  In addition, wheat acres
enrolled in the CRP reached 9.7 million acres, up from
9.1 million in 1997.  The effects of these nonprice fac-
tors could have reduced winter wheat plantings by as
much as 2.3 million acres—a large proportion of the
deviation (2.7 million acres) between model forecasts
and March intentions for 1998 
For 1997-crop winter wheat, agronomic practices,
weather, and increased yield risk all played an impor-
tant role in reducing winter wheat plantings (as shown
in the March intentions report) to 48.2 million acres,
down from 52.0 million in 1996.  Late row crop (soy-
beans in particular) harvest and wetness presented
problems in the Plains States and major SRW wheat
States.  In addition, high yield risk in years prior to
1997 also discouraged producers from growing SRW
wheat.  These factors, which are not reflected in the
acreage response model, might have explained a large
proportion of the deviation between model forecasts
and March intentions for 1997-crop winter wheat
plantings.
Spring Wheat
Spring wheat (including durum) planting intentions in
1999 were estimated by USDA in March 1999 at 19.6
million acres—a decline of 0.8 million acres from
1998’s  planting intentions, but only 0.3 million acres
less than actual 1998 plantings.  This projected decline
from 1998 intended acreage reflects a decline in the
expected price not only for hard red spring (HRS)
wheat but also for durum wheat.  The acreage response
model helps explain the reduction from the previous
year’s planting intentions.
As of March 15, 1999, the September futures price for
HRS at the Minneapolis Grain Exchange settled at
$3.56 per bushel—down 9.2 percent (in farm price
equivalent) from the September futures price in March
1998.  The farm price expected for durum wheat
declined even more, by 17.4 percent.  Thus, the
weighted average price expected for total spring wheat
declined by about 10.83 percent.  This price decline
implies a 3.15-percent decrease in total spring wheat
acreage (about 0.64 million acres) based on the 0.291
own-price elasticity (Lin, 1999a).  The 9.2-percent
decline in 1999 new-crop futures price for HRS wheat
was expected to lower HRS wheat plantings.  In con-
trast, an attractive revenue insurance coverage guaran-
tee for durum wheat in 1999 attracted durum plant-
ings, despite the lower expected market price.
The decline in the expected price for competing crops
(such as barley, corn, and soybeans) partly offsets the
effect on spring wheat plantings due to the decline in
the expected price for spring wheat itself, by adding
about 0.28 million acres.  Thus, including both own-
and cross-price effects together, based on market con-
ditions as of March 15, 1999, the acreage response
model suggests a slight decline in 1999’s spring wheat
planting intentions from 1998, to 20.02 million
acres—compared with the March planting intentions
estimate of 19.63 million acres.
Corn
Planting intentions for corn were estimated by USDA
to total 78.2 million acres in March 1999, down 2.6
million from 1998’s intentions.  The most significant
factor contributing to the decline is the 15.3-percent
decline in the expected harvesttime farm price for
corn, based on December 1999 new-crop futures prices
at Chicago in mid-March 1999.  Given the own-price
elasticity of 0.301 for corn, the decline in the expected
corn price implies a decline of 4.6 percent in corn
plantings from 1998, or about 3.73 million acres.
The decline in the expected price of competing crops
only partly offsets the effect on corn plantings due to
the decline in the expected corn price.  For corn pro-
ducers, the decline in expected prices for competing
crops based on new-crop futures prices in mid-March
1999 were 16.5 percent for soybeans (calculated at the
$5.26 per bushel loan rate), 13.2 percent for wheat,
15.3 percent for sorghum, and 11.3 percent for cotton.
The decline in the expected price of these competing
crops together is estimated to add about 2.71 million
acres to corn plantings, of which 1.88 million were
38 ✥ S Su up pp pl ly y   R Re es sp po on ns se e   U Un nd de er r   t th he e   1 19 99 96 6   F Fa ar rm m   A Ac ct t/ /T TB B- -1 18 88 88 8 E Ec co on no om mi ic c   R Re es se ea ar rc ch h   S Se er rv vi ic ce e/ /U US SD DA Aattributed to the decline in the expected soybean price.
Combining own- and cross-price effects suggests a
model forecast of 79.8 million acres for 1999 corn
planting intentions, compared with the 78.2 million-
acre planting intentions estimate.
A large proportion of the deviation between the price-
based model forecast and March intention for 1999
corn planting intentions might have been attributed to
concerns over aflatoxin (a fungus in corn crops) in the
South that reportedly could have lowered 1999 corn
plantings by about 1 million acres.22
Soybeans  
U.S. farmers intended to plant a record 73.1 million
acres of soybeans in 1999, as reported by USDA’s
March 1999 Prospective Plantings, which reflects a
continued steady upward trend in soybean acreage
since implementation of the 1996 Act.  On March 15,
new-crop soybean futures (November contract) settled
at $4.90 per bushel, down 25 percent from the March
1998 quote.  So why did soybean acreage continue to
expand when farmers faced a dramatic price decline?
The increase in planting intentions from 72 million
acres in 1998 to 73.1 in 1999 can be accounted for by
three factors.
The change in the expected farm price for soybeans,
including the incentive offered by marketing loan pro-
visions, is the most important factor that affected 1999
soybean plantings (Lin, 1999b).  Despite the 25-per-
cent decline in new-crop soybean futures prices
between 1998 and 1999, the soybean marketing loan
program guaranteed farmers a price of approximately
$5.26 per bushel.  As a per-unit price guarantee, the
program essentially reduces the decline in the expected
soybean farm price to producers from 25.3 percent to
16.5 percent.  Given the 0.268 own-price elasticity for
U.S. soybeans, the change in soybean’s own-price
expectations means that 1999 soybean plantings would
be reduced by 4.38 percent, or 3.15 million acres.
Partially offsetting this decline is the effect of lowered
expected prices for competing crops, which encourage
soybean plantings. The combined effect of lower
prices for corn (down 15.3 percent), wheat (down 15.6
percent), sorghum (down 15.3 percent), and cotton
(down 11.3 percent) resulted in a projected model
increase of 2.76 million acres in soybean plantings in
1999, offsetting much of the soybean own-price effect.
The expected corn price has the biggest impact (nearly
2.5 million acres), with the acreage price elasticity
showing that soybean plantings rise 0.23 percent for
each 1-percent decline in the price of corn. Combining
own- and cross-price effects suggest a model forecast
of 71.6 million acres for 1999 soybean planting inten-
tions, compared with the 73.1 million estimated by
USDA in the March 1999 intentions report.
Part of the 1.5-million-acre difference between the
model forecast and reported planting intentions may
reflect the fact that some farmers had greater cost sav-
ings in input use for soybeans than other crops, partic-
ularly with the recent introduction of herbicide-tolerant
varieties. 
Cotton
Planting intentions for the 1999 cotton were estimated
by USDA in March 1999 to total 13.94 million acres,
up 0.72 million from 1998’s planting intentions report.
The most significant factor contributing to the change
in plantings was the lower cotton price expected by
producers.  As of March 15, 1999, December 1999
new crop futures had settled at 59.15 cents per pound
in New York, for a 56.65 cents per pound farm price
equivalent.  The expected cotton farm price represents
a 19.0-percent decline from the expected farm price
based on March 1998 futures quotes.  However, the 52
cents per pound loan rate plus the fact that domestic
cotton prices could be 10 cents per pound higher than
the world price suggest an effective price to producers
of about 62 cents per pound.  Hence, the effective cot-
ton farm price in 1999 suggests only a decline of 11.3
percent in the expected producer price.  Given the esti-
mated price elasticity of 0.469, this decline in price
implies a 5.3-percent (or 0.7 million acres) drop in cot-
ton plantings.
The decline in the expected price of competing crops
more than offsets the effect on cotton plantings due to
the decline in expected cotton prices.  For cotton pro-
ducers, the decline in the expected price of competing
crops (corn, wheat, sorghum, and soybeans) con-
tributed to an increase of 0.93 million acres in cotton
plantings.  Combining own- and cross-price effects
suggests a model forecast of 13.45 million acres for
1999 cotton planting intentions, compared with the
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13.94 million estimated by USDA in the March 1999
intentions report.
A large portion of the 0.5 million-acre deviation
between the model forecast and March intention can
be attributed to the effect of nonprice factors, such as
aflatoxin for corn crops, on 1999 cotton plantings.
Concerns over aflatoxin for corn crops in the South
appeared to have caused farmers to switch a part of
corn land into cotton plantings.
Comparisons of the POLYSYS Simulation
Results Between “High-Price” and “Low-
Price” Scenarios, 1997-98
The comparison between model acreage forecasts and
March planting intentions reported above is intended
to examine whether the acreage price elasticities accu-
rately “forecast” planted acreage (in terms of planting
intentions) for major field crops in 1997-99.  In this
section, the focus is shifted to address whether the
effects of increased planting flexibility in the 1996 Act
scenario (relative to the February 1996 USDA high-
price baseline) on planted acreage, remain intact in
low-price market conditions.  
To address that issue, this section first compares the
POLYSYS simulation results between the February
1996 USDA baseline and the 1996 Act scenario
(through increased planting flexibility) under higher
price market conditions reflected in the February 1996
USDA baseline, as reported earlier in the simulation
analysis section of this report. Then, it compares the
POLYSYS simulation results between the two policy
scenarios under lower prices to analyze the effect of
increased planting flexibility under the 1996 Act sce-
nario on planted acreage with those market price con-
ditions. Lower market prices are simulated in these
scenarios by replacing projected crop yields and
exports from the February 1996 USDA baseline with
actual data in 1996 through 1998. Provisions of previ-
ous farm programs that could be triggered by lower
prices, such as ARPs, are assumed in the simulations to
be unchanged from the February 1996 USDA baseline.
Lower market prices in these scenarios are not reduced
to levels that result in marketing loan benefits, thus
allowing a comparison of planting flexibility impacts
across a range of prices where supply response is
based on market signals.  For example, corn farm
prices in 1998/99 are simulated at $2.34 per bushel
under the 1990 Act scenario, lower-price conditions,
compared with the $2.60 per bushel in the February
1996 USDA baseline (1990 Act baseline, higher-price
conditions).  Similarly, corn farm prices in 1998/99 are
simulated at $2.40 per bushel under the 1996 Act sce-
nario, lower-price conditions, compared with the $2.69
per bushel under the 1996 Act scenario, higher-price
conditions.
Except for the wheat results in 1998, virtually all of
the POLYSYS simulation results show that the pro-
gram effect—the change in planted acreage as a result
of increased planting flexibility under the 1996 Act
scenario (relative to the 1990 Act baseline)—would
remain quite similar in high-price and low-price sce-
narios (table 6).  The program effect for wheat under
the low-price scenario is estimated to reduce wheat
plantings by 0.9 million acres, down from a reduction
of 1.7 million acres under the high-price scenario.
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Table 6—Comparisons of the POLYSYS simulation results between “high-price”and “low-price” scenarios,
1997-98
1990 Act 1996 Act
Crop Market  condition scenarios scenarios Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(4)-(3)
Million acres
1997
Wheat High-price 73.5 72.2 -1.3
Low-price 74.2 72.9 -1.3
Corn High-price 80.0 78.1 -1.9
Low-price 79.2 77.4 -1.8
Soybeans High-price 61.5 64.2 +2.7
Low-price 62.7 65.1 +2.4
Cotton High-price 14.4 15.6 +1.2
Low-price 14.1 15.3 +1.2
1998
Wheat High-price 73.7 72.0 -1.7
Low-price 71.3 70.4 -  .9
Corn High-price 80.0 79.2 -  .8
Low-price 78.7 78.1 -  .6
Soybeans High-price 61.5 63.2 +1.7
Low-price 63.1 64.5 +1.4
Cotton High-price 14.1 15.2 +1.1
Low-price 14.1 15.4 +1.3Conclusions
Because the 1996 Act allows farmers nearly complete
planting flexibility, own- and cross-price acreage elas-
ticities (measures of a producer’s production/acreage
response to changes in crop prices) for major U.S.
field crops are greater, in most cases, under the 1996
Act than those estimated under previous legislation.
The increase in acreage price elasticities over previous
legislation (especially compared with those estimated
for 1986-90) reflects the 1996 Act’s removal of both
the institutional barriers (including base acreage pro-
tection) and the economic barriers (concerns over gov-
ernment payments) to greater planting flexibility for
crop producers.
In percentage terms, cross-price acreage elasticities
estimated under the 1996 Act generally increase even
more than own-price elasticities. This implies that
farm commodity programs in the past might have
restricted acreage shifts from program crops to other
crops.
Simulation results using a U.S. agricultural sector
model indicate that the aggregate impact of the 1996
Act on area planted to the eight major field crops
(wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, oats, soybeans, cotton,
and rice) is small when compared with plantings under
a continuation of the 1990 Act.  The effect of the 1996
Act on planted acreage for individual crops differs by
commodity and has the least impact on U.S. wheat
acreage.  Due to small changes in acreage price elas-
ticities between the 1996 Act and 1990 Act, U.S.
wheat planted acreage under the 1996 Act scenario, on
average, differs very little during the 1996-2005 simu-
lation period from the 1990 Act baseline.  Corn
acreage expansion in the Central and Northern Plains,
a long-term trend in this important wheat production
region, would contract under the 1996 Act.  In con-
trast, soybean acreage expansion in this region would
accelerate under the 1996 Act.  
The change in farm legislation is simulated to have its
biggest acreage impact on soybeans—an increase of
over 2 million acres under the 1996 Act through the
1996-2005 simulation period.  Nearly full planting
flexibility allows corn producers to make a switch
from corn to soybeans.  Greater planting flexibility
under the 1996 Act would lower corn planted acreage
by an average of 1-2 million acres from the 1990 Act
baseline but increase upland cotton acreage by 0.7 mil-
lion acres.
The effect of the farm legislation change on regional
production patterns of major field crops varies, ranging
from the smallest for wheat to a more noticeable
change for cotton.  Overall, the effect appears to be
modest.  Due to a small change in wheat acreage price
elasticities from the 1996 Act across production
regions, regional production patterns for U.S. wheat
would remain largely unchanged.  Corn production
would be slightly more concentrated in the North
Central and Southeast and Delta regions.  In contrast,
soybean production would be slightly less concentrat-
ed in the North Central region.  In the case of cotton
production, the Southeast stands to gain a larger share
of U.S. acreage under the 1996 Act at the expense of
the Southern Plains.  
The effects of the change in 1996 farm legislation on
crop acreage were initially estimated under market
conditions with relatively high farm commodity prices.
However, these program effects remain largely the
same under a lower price market conditions.  The
acreage response model (using acreage price elastici-
ties estimated in this study), in general, performs well
in forecasting planted acreage for major field crops.
When the deviation between model forecasts and
March planting intentions is significant, much of the
difference can be attributed to nonprice factors, such as
weather, crop fungus, or plant disease.  The model
does equally well in forecasting acreage response in
both high-price and low-price scenarios. 
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Appendix table 1—Estimated regression coefficients in wheat acreage response on NFA by 
production region1
Explanatory Model I Model II
Region variable (lower bound) (upper bound)
Central and Wheat net returns 0.147* 0.359*
Northern Plains (2.29)2 (1.90)
Soybean net returns  -.028 -.005
(-.90) (-.17)
Barley net returns -.146** —
(-2.90)
Sorghum net returns — -.354*
(-1.86)
Southern Plains Wheat net returns .632** .749**
(5.32) (6.37)
Cotton net returns -.060* -.062*
(-2.18) (-2.02)
Corn net returns -.072* -.095
(-2.44) (-1.49)
Sorghum net returns -.150 -.431*
(-1.32) (-1.84)
North Central  Wheat net returns .095 .169**
(1.65) (4.43)
Corn net returns -.007 -.120**
(-.40) (-6.63)
Soybean net returns -.019 -.049
(-.65) (-.96)
Oat net returns -.418** —
(-5.00)
Southeast and Delta Wheat net return .226** .369**
(4.03) (7.28)
Soybean net returns .265** .417**
(4.65) (4.28)
Corn net returns -.122** -.199**
(-2.77) (-2.72)
1Estimates for the Central and Northern Plains and the North Central regions reflect selected theoretical restrictions.
2Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
— = Not applicable.
*   = Significant at 5-percent level of significance.
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Appendix table 2—Estimated regression coefficients in corn acreage response on NFA by production
region1
Explanatory Model I Model II
Region variable (lower bound) (upper bound)3
North Central Corn net returns 0.336**  0.255**
(4.63)2 (4.68)
Soybean net returns -.324** -.215**
(-4.53) (-3.65)
Wheat net returns  -.012 -.040
(-1.54) (-1.34)
Central and Corn net returns .201*  .370**
Northern Plains (2.04) (5.38)
Wheat net returns -.092 -.185*  
(-.85) (-1.86)
Soybean net returns -.050 —
(-1.32)  
Sorghum net returns -.059  -.185*
(-1.51) (-1.71)
Southeast and Delta Corn net returns  .024** .142**
(3.57) (7.41)
Cotton net returns -.026* -.311*
(-1.78) (-2.13)
Soybean net returns -.049 —
(-1.32)
Wheat net returns -.073** -.086**
(-3.07) (-3.14)
Southern Plains Corn net returns .095* .205**
(2.33) (3.14)
Cotton net returns -.119** -.216*
(-3.54) (-2.23)
Sorghum net returns -.150 -.235**
(-1.36) (-2.53)
1Estimates for the Central and Northern Plains and North Central regions reflect theoretical restrictions of symmetry and linear homogeneity.
2Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
3Regression coefficients in Model II, in a few cases, are smaller than those in Model I; however, acreage price elasticities calculated from 
Model II remain larger than from Model I.
— = Not applicable.
*   = Significant at 5-percent level of significance.
** = Significant at 1-percent level of significance.E Ec co on no om mi ic c   R Re es se ea ar rc ch h   S Se er rv vi ic ce e/ /U US SD DA A S Su up pp pl ly y   R Re es sp po on ns se e   U Un nd de er r   t th he e   1 19 99 96 6   F Fa ar rm m   A Ac ct t/ /T TB B- -1 18 88 88 8 ✥ 47
Appendix table 4—Estimated regression coefficients in barley acreage response on NFA by production
region (with restrictions)
Explanatory Model I Model II
Region variable (lower bound) (upper bound)
Central and Barley net returns 0.041 0.071
Northern Plains (.62)1 (1.07)
Corn net returns -.101  -.116*
(-1.68) (-1.93)
Sorghum net returns -.735* -.679*
(-2.30) (-2.12)
1Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
*  = Significant at 5-percent level of significance.
Appendix table 3—Estimated regression coefficients in sorghum acreage response on NFA by production
region1
Explanatory Model I Model II
Region variable (lower bound) (upper bound)
Central & Sorghum net returns 0.086 0.050
Northern Plains (1.23)2 (1.03)
Wheat net returns -.689** -.470**
(-2.68) (-2.61)
Corn net returns -.088 —
(-.81)
Southern Plains Sorghum net returns  .735**  .759**
(5.10) (4.68)
Cotton net returns -.048* -.063**
(-2.41) (-2.99)
Corn net returns -.057* -.067**
(-2.20)   (-2.55)
Wheat net returns  -.399* -.419*
(-2.05)    (-2.17)
Southeast & Delta Sorghum net returns .104** .128*
(3.07) (2.07)
Soybean net returns -.243** -.256**
(-3.32) (-3.31)
1Model I estimates for the Southeast and Delta regions reflect theoretical restriction of symmetry.
2Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
— = Not applicable.
*   = Significant at 5-percent level of significance.
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Appendix table 5—Estimated regression coefficients in oat acreage response on NFA by production
region1
Explanatory Model I Model II
Region variable (lower bound) (upper bound)
North Central Oat net returns 0.123*  —
(2.29)2
Wheat net returns -.123*  —
(-2.30)
1Reflects theoretical restrictions.
2Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
— = Not applicable.
*   = Significant at 5-percent level of significance.
Appendix table 6—Estimated regression coefficients in soybean acreage response on NFA (for program
crops) by production region1
Explanatory  Model I Model II
Region variable (lower bound) (upper bound)
North Central Soybean net returns 0.324**   —
(7.81)2
Corn net returns -.324** —
(-5.19)
Central & Soybean net returns   .103*  —
Northern Plains (2.18)
Corn net returns -.050  —
(-1.32)
Wheat net returns  -.053 —
(-.91)
Southeast & Delta Soybean net returns  .132**  —
(9.13)
Cotton net returns -.234** —
(-2.92)
Corn net returns -.054*  —
(-2.44)
Wheat net returns -.072** —
(-2.87)
1Model estimates for the North Central and the Central and Northern Plains regions reflect theoretical restrictions of symmetry and linear homo-
geneity; estimates for the Southeast and Delta region reflect symmetry restriction.
2Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
— = Not applicable.
*   = Significant at 5-percent level of significance.
**  = significant at 1-percent level of significance.E Ec co on no om mi ic c   R Re es se ea ar rc ch h   S Se er rv vi ic ce e/ /U US SD DA A S Su up pp pl ly y   R Re es sp po on ns se e   U Un nd de er r   t th he e   1 19 99 96 6   F Fa ar rm m   A Ac ct t/ /T TB B- -1 18 88 88 8 ✥ 49
Appendix table 7—Estimated regression coefficients in cotton acreage response on NFA by production
region 
Explanatory Model I Model II
Region  variable (lower bound) (upper bound)
Southern Plains Cotton net returns 0.152** 0.277**
(2.98)1 (5.38)
Sorghum net returns  -.200** -.306**
(-3.73) (-3.26)
Southeast and Delta Cotton net returns .032 .142**
(1.37) (5.38)
Soybean net returns  — -.370**
(-3.19)
Corn net returns   -.101 -.232**
(-1.44) (-2.91)
Wheat net returns -.160** -.223**
(-2.87) (-2.55)
1Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
— = Not applicable.
*   = Significant at 5-percent level of significance.
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Appendix table 8—Acreage price elasticities for corn, soybeans, wheat, and oats in the North Central
region, without theoretical restrictions
NFA acreage price elasticity  Whole-farm under 1996 Act
Item 1986-90 This study1 Adams This study1 Adams
Corn acreage elasticities
Corn price 0.159 1.465  0.673  0.293 0.372
Soybean price  -0.088 -1.258 -0.364 -0.203 -0.213
Wheat price    -0.004 -0.149  -0.044 -0.018 —
Soybean acreage elasticities
Soybean price  0.254 2.440 0.835 . 0.348 0.323
Corn price  -0.213 -1.272 -0.900 -0.261 -0.273
Wheat price -0.007 0.191 -0.088 0.004 —
Wheat acreage elasticities
Wheat price  0.553 0.523  0.901 0.586 0.670
Soybean price  -0.109 -0.517 -0.229 -0.149 -0.209
Oat price — -0.113 — -0.098  —
Oat acreage elasticities
Oat price 0.430 0.041  2.199  0.460 0.546
Wheat price  -0.013 -0.527 -0.823 -0.017 —
1Average of Model I (lower bound) and Model II (upper bound) results.
— = Not applicable.E Ec co on no om mi ic c   R Re es se ea ar rc ch h   S Se er rv vi ic ce e/ /U US SD DA A S Su up pp pl ly y   R Re es sp po on ns se e   U Un nd de er r   t th he e   1 19 99 96 6   F Fa ar rm m   A Ac ct t/ /T TB B- -1 18 88 88 8 ✥ 51
Appendix table 9—Acreage price elasticities for corn, soybeans, wheat, and oats in the North Central
region, with theoretical restrictions1
NFA acreage price elasticity  Whole-farm under 1996 Act
Item 1986-90 This study2 Adams This study2 Adams
Corn acreage elasticities
Corn price 0.159 0.995 0.673 0.248 0.372
Soybean price  -0.088 -0.843 -0.364  -0.164 -0.213
Wheat price     — -0.113 -0.044 -0.056 —
Soybean acreage elasticities
Soybean price 0.254 1.286 0.835 0.298 0.323
Corn price -0.213 -1.533 -0.900 -0.274 -0.273
Wheat price — — -0.088 — —
Wheat acreage elasticities
Wheat price 0.553 0.283 0.901 0.567 0.670
Soybean price -0.109 -0.143 -0.229 -0.117 -0.209
Oat price — -0.090 — -0.096 —
Corn price -0.133 -0.228  -0.635 -0.138       -0.280
Oat acreage elasticities
Oat price    0.430 0.065 2.199 0.461 0.546
Wheat price  — -0.525 -0.823 -0.030 —
Corn price   -0.181  — -0.144   — -0.304
Soybean price -0.149 — -2.625 — -0.227
1Estimates from this study reflect theoretical restrictions as indicated in appendix tables 1, 2, 5, and 6.
2Average of Model I (lower bound) and Model II (upper bound) results.
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Appendix table 10—Acreage price elasticities for wheat, corn, soybeans, sorghum, and barley in the Central
& Northern Plains
NFA acreage price elasticity  Whole-farm under 1996 Act
Item 1986-90 This study1 Adams This study1 Adams
Wheat acreage elasticities
Wheat price   0.201 0.508 0.811 0.240 0.356
Soybean price —- -0.058 -0.048 -0.010 —
Sorghum price       -0.112 -0.560 -0.109 -0.072 -0.159
Barley price -0.090 -0.652 -0.112 -0.080 -0.118
Corn acreage elasticities
Corn price 0.101 1.711 0.986 0.242 0.381
Wheat price — -0.289 -0.207 -0.041 —
Soybean price -0.021 -0.099 -0.463 -0.027 -0.138
Sorghum price      -0.015 -0.291   -0.036 -0.040 -0.094
Soybean acreage elasticities
Soybean price 0.174 1.022 1.223 0.198 0.371
Wheat price    — -0.484 -0.265 -0.042 —
Corn price -0.197 -1.075 -0.748 -0.221 -0.321
Sorghum acreage elasticities
Sorghum price 0.462 0.157 1.770 0.446 -0.637
Corn price -0.382 -0.746 -0.790 -0.401 -0.604
Wheat price -0.157 -1.927 -0.567 -0.251 -0.220
Barley acreage elasticities
Barley price  0.201 0.328 2.841 0.206 0.570
Corn price — -1.048 -0.615 -0.062  —
Sorghum price  —  -1.258  —   -0.070 — 
Wheat price -0.098 — -1.131 — -0.351 
1Average of Model I (lower bound) and Model II (upper bound) results; reflect theoretical restrictions as indicated in appendix tables 1, 2, and 6.
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Appendix table 11—Acreage price elasticities for cotton, corn, wheat, sorghum, and soybeans in the
Southeast and Delta regions
NFA acreage price elasticity  Whole-farm under 1996 Act
Item 1986-90 This study1 Adams This study1 Adams
Cotton acreage elasticities
Cotton price  0.424 0.586 0.900  0.435 0.731
Soybean price -0.130 -0.710 -0.490 -0.183 -0.223
Corn price —- -0.404   —- -0.154 —
Wheat price -0.113 -0.335 -0.080 -0.136 -0.211
Corn acreage elasticities
Corn price 0.785 1.034 0.474 0.794  0.907
Cotton price -0.360 -0.467 -0.107   -0.364 -0.642
Soybean price -0.334 -0.180 -0.178 -0.326 -0.393
Wheat price            -0.281 -0.378  -0.024   -0.285    -0.366
Wheat acreage elasticities
Wheat price 0.216 1.462  2.226 0.267  0.546
Soybean price  0.136 1.611 -1.012 0.164 0.272
Corn price   -0.161 -0.942 -0.607 -0.193 -0.428
Sorghum price   —- –– -0.092 — -0.126
Cotton price   -0.316  —- -1.017 —  -0.659
Sorghum acreage elasticities
Sorghum price         0.372 1.694  2.179 0.406 0.742
Soybean price- -0.515 -2.288 -0.646 -0.525 -0.673
Corn price —- — -0.907 — —
Soybean acreage elasticities
Soybean price     0.199  0.658  0.598 0.221  0.411
Cotton price     -0.080    -1.178 -0.149 -0.095  -0.144
Corn price -0.051 -1.127   — -0.088 -0.144
Wheat price   —- -0.769 -0.414 -0.008 —
Sorghum price -0.028 — -0.102 — -0.055
1Average of Model I (lower bound) and Model II (upper bound) results; reflect theoretical restrictions as indicated in appendix tables 3 and 6.
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Appendix table 12—Acreage price elasticities for cotton, corn, wheat, and sorghum in the Southern Plains
region 
NFA acreage price elasticity  Whole-farm under 1996 Act
Item 1986-90 This study1 Adams This study1 Adams
Cotton acreage elasticities
Cotton price   0.345 2.282 0.797 0.480 0.564
Sorghum price      -0.193 -0.727 -0.450 -0.231 -0.361
Corn acreage elasticities
Corn price  0.311 1.789 0.499 0.402 0.398
Cotton price — -0.363   -0.023  -0.049 -0.043
Sorghum price — -0.743 -0.015 -0.047 -0.021 
Soybean price  -0.123 —  -0.220  —   -0.245
Wheat acreage elasticities
Wheat price 0.336  1.319 0.960   0.393 0.443
Cotton price — -0.815 -0.088  -0.073 -0.089
Corn price — -1.009 -0.104 -0.087 -0.064
Sorghum price  —- -1.102 -0.109  -0.166 -0.159
Sorghum acreage elasticities
Sorghum price  0.604 3.034 1.314     0.728 0.766
Cotton price  -0.423 -0.952   -0.454 -0.450 -0.500
Corn price  —- -0.845 -0.763 -0.247 -0.298
Wheat price —- -0.877 -0.478   -0.121 -0.171   
1Average of Model I (lower bound) and Model II (upper bound) results.
— = Not applicable.E Ec co on no om mi ic c   R Re es se ea ar rc ch h   S Se er rv vi ic ce e/ /U US SD DA A S Su up pp pl ly y   R Re es sp po on ns se e   U Un nd de er r   t th he e   1 19 99 96 6   F Fa ar rm m   A Ac ct t/ /T TB B- -1 18 88 88 8 ✥ 55
Appendix table 13—Acreage price elasticities for wheat in major production regions under the 1996 Act vs.
previous legislation
Item 1986-901 1991-951 1996 Act2  Percent difference   
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(3) vs. (1) (5)=(3) vs. (2)
Central and Northern Plains
Wheat price 0.201 0.271 0.240 +19.4 -11.4
Barley price -0.090 -0.086 -0.072 - 20.0 -16.3
Sorghum price -0.112 -0.118 -0.080 - 28.6 -32.2
Soybean price — -0.005 -0.010 — +100.0
Southern Plains
Wheat price 0.336 0.398 0.393 +17.0  - 1.3
Sorghum price — -0.009 -0.166 — +1,744.4
Corn price — — -0.087 — —
Cotton price — -0.001 -0.073 — +7,200.0 
Soybean price — -0.002 — —  —
North Central
Wheat price  0.553 0.594 0.567 +2.5 - 4.5
Corn price -0.133 -0.186 -0.138 +3.8 -25.8
Soybean price -0.109 -0.118 -0.117 +7.3 -0.8
Oat price — — -0.096 — —
Southeast and Delta
Wheat price 0.216 0.404 0.267 +23.6 -23.9
Corn price -0.161 -0.225 -0.193 +19.9 -14.2
Soybean price 0.136 0.117 0.164 +20.6 +40.2
Cotton price -0.316 -0.345 — — —
— = Not applicable.
1Estimates obtained by Adams.
2Estimates obtained from this study (average of Model I and Model II results); estimates for the Central and Northern Plains and the North
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Appendix table 14—Acreage price elasticities for corn in major production regions under the 1996 Act vs.
previous legislation
Item 1986-901 1991-951 1996 Act2  Percent difference   
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(3) vs. (1) (5)=(3) vs. (2)
North Central
Corn price 0.159 0.173 0.248 +56.0 +43.4
Soybean price -0.088 -0.104 -0.164 +86.4 +57.7
Wheat price — -0.004 -0.056 — +1,300.0
Central and Northern Plains
Corn price 0.101 0.179 0.242 +139.6 +35.2
Wheat price — -0.017 -0.041 — +141.2
Soybean price -0.021 -0.052 -0.027 +28.6 -48.1
Sorghum price -0.015 -0.008 -0.040 +166.7 +400.0
Southeast and Delta
Corn price 0.785 0.837 0.794 +1.1 -5.1
Cotton price -0.360 -0.343 -0.364 +1.1 +6.1
Soybean price -0.334 -0.312 -0.326 -2.4 +4.5
Wheat price -0.281 -0.253 -0.285 +1.4 +12.6 
Southern Plains
Corn price 0.311 0.311 0.402 +29.3 +29.3
Cotton price — -0.001 -0.049 — +4,800.0
Sorghum price — -0.003 -0.047 — +1,466.7
Soybean price -0.123 -0.111 — — —
— = Not applicable.
1Estimates obtained by Adams.
2Estimates obtained from this study (average of Model I and Model II results); estimates for the Central and Northern Plains and North Central
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Appendix table 15—Acreage price elasticities for sorghum in major production regions under the 1996 Act
vs. previous legislation
Item 1986-901 1991-951 1996 Act2  Percent difference   
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(3) vs. (1) (5)=(3) vs. (2)
Central and Northern Plains
Sorghum price 0.462 0.642 0.446 -3.5 -30.5
Corn price -0.382 -0.470 -0.401 +5.0 -14.7
Wheat price -0.157 -0.196 -0.251 +59.9 +28.1
Soybean price — -0.026 — — —
Southern Plains
Sorghum price 0.604 0.666 0.728 +20.5 +9.3
Cotton price -0.423 -0.344 -0.450 +6.4 +30.8
Corn price — -0.042 -0.247 — +416.7
Wheat price — -0.021 -0.121 — +476.2
Southeast and Delta
Sorghum price 0.372 0.398 0.406 +9.1 +2.0
Cotton price — -0.019 — —                       —
Corn price — -0.022 –– — —
Soybean price -0.515 -0.345 -0.525 +1.9 +50.7
— = Not applicable.
1Estimates obtained by Adams.
2Estimates obtained from this study (average of Model I and Model II results); Model I results for the Southeast and Delta regions reflect theo-
retical restriction of symmetry.
Appendix table 16—Acreage price elasticities for barley in major production regions under the 1996 Act vs.
previous legislation
Item 1986-901 1991-951 1996 Act2  Percent difference   
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(3) vs. (1) (5)=(3) vs. (2)
Central and Northern Plains
Barley price 0.201 0.645 0.206 +2.5 -68.1
Corn price — — -0.062 —  —
Sorghum price — — -0.070 — —
Soybean price — -0.024 — — —
Wheat price -0.098 -0.147 — — —
— = Not applicable.
1Estimates obtained by Adams.
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Appendix table 17—Acreage price elasticities for oats in major production regions under the 1996 Act vs.
previous legislation
Item 1986-901 1991-951 1996 Act2  Percent difference   
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(3) vs. (1) (5)=(3) vs. (2)
North Central
Oat price 0.430 0.599  0.461 +7.2 -23.0
Wheat price — -0.013 -0.030   — +130.8
Corn price -0.181 -0.297 —     —       —
Soybean price -0.149 -0.270 —        — —
— = Not applicable.
1Estimates obtained by FAPRI (Adams).
2Estimates obtained from this study (Model I results); reflect theoretical restrictions.
Appendix table 18—Acreage price elasticities for soybeans in major production regions under the 1996 Act
vs. previous legislation
Item 1986-901 1991-951 1996 Act2  Percent difference   
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(3) vs. (1) (5)=(3) vs. (2)
North Central
Soybean price 0.254 0.262 0.298 +17.3 +13.7
Corn price -0.213 -0.265 -0.274 +28.6  +3.4
Barley price — -0.001 — — —
Oat price — -0.002 — — —
Sorghum price — -0.002 — — —
Wheat price — -0.007 —  —  —
Central and Northern Plains
Soybean price 0 .174 0.263 0.198 +13.8 -24.7
Wheat price — -0.030 -0.042 — +40.0
Corn price -0.197 -0.259 -0.221 +12.2 -14.7
Barley price — -0.010 — — —
Oat price — -0.005 — — —
Sorghum price — -0.024 — — —
Southeast and Delta
Soybean price 0.199 0 .217 0.221 +11.1 +1.8
Cotton price -0.080 -0.086 -0.095 +18.8 +10.5
Corn price -0.051 -0.057 -0.088 +72.5 +54.4
Wheat price — -0.028 -0.008 — -71.4
Sorghum price -0.028 -0.040 –– –– ––
Rice price — -0.015 —                         — —
— = Not applicable.
1Estimates obtained by Adams.
2Estimates obtained from this study (Model I results); estimates for the North Central and the Central and Northern Plains regions reflect theo-
retical restrictions of symmetry and linear homogeneity; estimates for the Southeast and Delta region reflect symmetry restriction.E Ec co on no om mi ic c   R Re es se ea ar rc ch h   S Se er rv vi ic ce e/ /U US SD DA A S Su up pp pl ly y   R Re es sp po on ns se e   U Un nd de er r   t th he e   1 19 99 96 6   F Fa ar rm m   A Ac ct t/ /T TB B- -1 18 88 88 8 ✥ 59
Appendix table 20—Acreage price elasticities for rice in major production regions under the 1996 Act vs.
previous legislation
Item 1986-901 1991-951 1996 Act1  Percent difference   
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(3) vs. (1) (5)=(3) vs. (2)
Delta
Rice price 0.373 0.418 0.733 +96.5 +75.4
Sorghum price -0.211 -0.178 -0.466 +120.9 +161.8
Soybean price -0.229 -0.146 -0.500 +118.3 +242.5
Southern Plains
Rice price 0.227 0.605 0.615 +88.9 +1.7
Far West
Rice price 0.434 1.693 0.785 +80.9 -67.6
1Source: Estimates obtained by Adams.
Appendix table 19—Acreage price elasticities for cotton in major production regions under the 1996 Act vs.
previous legislation
Item 1986-901 1991-951 1996 Act2  Percent difference   
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(3) vs. (1) (5)=(3) vs. (2)
Southeast and Delta
Cotton price 0.424 0.419 0.435 +6.1 +3.8
Soybean price -0.130 -0.085 -0.183 +40.8 +115.3
Corn price — — -0.154 — —
Wheat price -0.113 -0.095 -0.136 +20.4 +43.2
Sorghum price — -0.002 — — —  
Southern Plains 
Cotton price 0.345 0.263 0.480 +39.1 +82.5
Sorghum price -0.193 -0.171 -0.231 +19.7 +35.1
— = Not applicable.
1Estimates obtained by Adams.
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Appendix table 21—National acreage price elasticities for major field crops in the United States1
Acreage price elasticity with respect to a 1-percent change in price of
Commodity Wheat Corn Sorghum Barley Oats Soybeans Cotton
Wheat 0.340 -0.046 -0.075 -0.076 -0.011 -0.010 -0.014
Corn -0.065 0.293 -0.010 -0.145 -0.028
Sorghum -0.168 -0.303 0.550 -0.070 -0.161
Barley -0.075 -0.038 -0.043 0.282 -0.005 
Oats -0.082 -0.041 -0.060 0.442
Soybeans -0.007 -0.229 0.269 -0.020
Cotton -0.058 -0.072 -0.103 -0.081 0.466
1U.S. acreage price elasticities are weighted averages of acreage price elasticities in major production regions based on regional shares of U.S.





























































































































































Appendix table 22—Price flexibility functions for the POLYSYS-ERS model by crop 
Price flexibility at various stocks-to-use levels--
Crop 0.05-0.066 0.066-0.10 0.10-0.15 0.15-0.20 0.20-0.25 0.25-0.30 0.30-0.35 0.35-0.50  0.50-0.55    0.55 -0.60 >0.60
Corn -5.5 -4.0 -2.8 -2.0 -1.6 -1.4 -1.0 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7
Wheat -6.7 -3.9 -2.7 -2.0 -1.6 -1.4 -1.3 -1.1 -1.1 -1.0 -1.0
Soybeans -2.6 -1.4 -1.1 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
Cotton   — -4.0 -2.9 -2.1 -1.7 -1.6 -1.2 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9
Rice -3.0 -2.8 -2.2 -1.6 -1.2 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
— = Not available.
Note: These price flexibilities are derived from ERS in-house work on the price and stocks relationship for major program crops.
Price flexibilities for sorghum, barley, and oats are primarily related to corn prices based on the following relationships:
LnPsg= -0.01748 + 0.97813 LnPcn - 0.01760 Ln(S/U)sg
LnPbr= 0.12468 + 0.77268 LnPcn
LnPot= 1.43659 + 0.57235 LnPcn - 0.44132 Ln(S/U)ot
where Psg, Pbr, Pot, and Pcn refer to the price of sorghum, barley, oats, and corn, respectively, and (S/U) refers to the stocks-to-use ratio.